Tool AT-W36REV. 2026-A

Calculate function selectors and event topics, in reverse too

The function selector is the first 4 bytes of the Keccak-256 hash of the canonical signature, that is, name and parameter types without spaces and without names. transfer(address,uint256) becomes 0xa9059cbb. An event topic0 is the same hash in full length, an error selector is formed like that of a function. The calculator builds the canonical form from source code or ABI itself and looks selectors up in a list of 401 known signatures.

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Paste a signature, read off selector and topic

Calculator · selector, topic0, error selector and reverse lookup

The calculator builds signatures according to the Solidity ABI specification. It does not read the blockchain and does not trigger a transaction. Whether a contract really has a function is shown only by its bytecode or the verified source code.

InputPaste a signature, Solidity, ABI or selector

Accepted are single signatures, lines from source code, whole contracts with struct and enum, ABI JSON (including Hardhat or Foundry artefacts) and hex values to look up, several per line. The tool recognises the kind itself.

Result

Enter a signature, Solidity, an ABI or a selector.

    List of known signatures: standards and common libraries, each group with its source, as of 14 November 2026. We develop smart contracts and interfaces for them under Web3 development.

    Runs in your browser. Nothing is sent or stored.

    How a selector is formed

    A transaction to a contract begins with 4 bytes. At the start of its code, the contract compares them with the selectors of its functions and jumps to the matching one; the arguments follow. Where the 4 bytes come from is set by the Solidity ABI specification: you write the signature in a fixed form, hash it with Keccak-256 and take the beginning. Because this comparison is in the bytecode, a contract's selectors can also be read without the source code Grech et al. 2019.

    keccak256("transfer(address,uint256)")SELECTOR · 4 BYTES · 0xA9059CBBa9059cbb2ab09eb219583f4a59a5d0623ade346d962bcd4e46b11da047c9049bTOPIC0 FOR EVENTS · ALL 32 BYTES

    Fig. 1 · Keccak-256 over the canonical signature, calculated with the same code as the tool.

    The canonical form

    Canonical means: name, parentheses, the types with exactly one comma between them. Parameter names, memory and calldata, visibility, modifiers and the return type are not part of it. A single space gives a completely different hash. In addition there are substitutions, because the ABI does not know some Solidity types:

    Solidity type and form in the selector (calculated)
    SolidityExampleIn the selectorRule
    uint, intuint menge, int deltaf(uint256,int256)always with bit width
    address payableaddress payable anf(address)payable is dropped
    Contract, interfaceIERC20 tokenf(address)becomes address
    enumStatus s with enum Status { Offen, Beendet }f(uint8)uint8; before 0.8.0 larger for more than 256 values
    custom value typePreis p with type Preis is uint128f(uint128)the underlying type
    structGebot g with struct Gebot { address bieter; uint betrag; }f((address,uint256))tuple in brackets, nested too
    Arraysuint[] a, address[3] bf(uint256[],address[3])length stays, element type becomes canonical
    fixed, ufixedfixed xf(fixed128x18)fixed128x18 or ufixed128x18
    byte (up to 0.7)byte bf(bytes1)bytes1
    Function typefunction(uint) external returns (bool) cbf(function)function, encoded like bytes24
    public variablemapping(address => mapping(address => uint)) public allowanceallowance(address,address)Getter: one key per mapping, uint256 per array level

    Rules according to the Solidity ABI specification, sections “Types” and “Mapping Solidity to ABI types”, as of 14 November 2026.

    Functions of the same name with different types are different functions. ERC-721 has two safeTransferFrom: with a data field 0xb88d4fde, without 0x42842e0e. A public state variable gets a getter with its own selector; mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf gives balanceOf(address) and hence 0x70a08231, exactly like the function from ERC-20. Libraries form selectors for storage pointers and structs by a rule of their own that uses type names; the tool does not calculate such functions and says so.

    Topic0 for events, selectors for errors

    A log entry carries up to four topics. The first is the full hash of the event signature, the others are the indexed parameters, at most three. The non-indexed ones are in the data part. Anyone querying logs therefore filters on topic0: studies of the token ecosystem build their data from event logs in just this way Chen et al. 2020.

    • Same name, same hash. Transfer from ERC-20 and Transfer from ERC-721 both have the topic0 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef. Whether a parameter is indexed does not change the signature. You can tell the two apart by the number of topics: three for ERC-20, four for ERC-721.
    • Indexed text and arrays. For string, bytes, arrays and structs, the topic holds only the Keccak hash of the value. You cannot get the text itself back from the log.
    • Anonymous events. With anonymous the topic0 is omitted, but a fourth parameter may be indexed. Filtering is then possible only by address and values.

    Errors on abort

    When a contract aborts, the return data begins with an error selector, formed as for functions. Two are built in: 0x08c379a0 stands for Error(string) from require or revert with a message, 0x4e487b71 for Panic(uint256) with a code. Since Solidity 0.8.4 there are custom errors such as error ERC20InsufficientBalance(address,uint256,uint256), selector 0xe450d38c. The values 0x00000000 and 0xffffffff are reserved; if a custom error hits one of them, the calculator warns you.

    Panic codes according to the Solidity docs
    CodeCause
    0x00generic abort inserted by the compiler
    0x01assert with a false condition
    0x11overflow or underflow outside unchecked
    0x12division or modulo by zero
    0x21value too large or negative for an enum
    0x22incorrectly encoded byte array in storage
    0x31.pop() on an empty array
    0x32index out of bounds of an array, bytesN or slice
    0x41too much memory requested or array too large
    0x51call of an uninitialised internal function variable

    What a selector reveals and what it does not

    A hash cannot be reversed. You can only check whether a known signature produces the same value. That is exactly what the reverse lookup does, with its own list of 263 functions, 69 events and 69 errors from the standards and the libraries that almost every contract uses. Why such a list goes a long way is down to the ecosystem: over 96 per cent of the contracts examined had duplicates He et al. 2020, and more than 80 per cent of the sub-contracts come from outside sources, a good third of them interfaces for standards Sun et al. 2023.

    A match still only means: this signature fits. Public databases with millions of entries are incomplete, which is why researchers read the selector and parameter types directly from the bytecode, with a 98.7 per cent hit rate Chen et al. 2022. Decompilers also derive the arguments Grech et al. 2022, but are not free of errors Liu et al. 2023. And a contract that has all ERC-20 selectors is not yet a proper token: detection by interface finds standard tokens reliably, while tokens that deliberately avoid the standard can be identified only through their behaviour Fröwis et al. 2019. Which standards a contract fulfils can be checked from the bytecode di Angelo and Salzer 2020; the calculator works out the ERC-165 interface IDs for that.

    Four bytes are quickly found

    A selector has 2³² possible values, around 4.3 billion. That sounds like a lot, but it is not enough against intent. At about 77,163 arbitrary signatures, the probability of some pair with the same selector is already 50 per cent. Anyone who wants to hit a particular selector deliberately tries names until one fits. For today's computers that is no obstacle:

    Same selector, different signature (calculated)
    SelectorSignature ASignature BKnown as
    0x42966c68burn(uint256)collate_propagate_storage(bytes16)Textbook example for proxies
    0x23b872ddtransferFrom(address,address,uint256)gasprice_bit_ether(int128)ERC-20 against a meaningless signature
    0x41973cd9putCurEpochConPubKeyBytes(bytes)f1121318093(bytes,bytes,uint64)Poly Network, August 2021

    In the attack on Poly Network in August 2021, the attacker looked for exactly such a function name: the call landed at putCurEpochConPubKeyBytes(bytes), because both give 0x41973cd9 (incident report at rekt.news). The calculator therefore warns if an entered selector belongs to a different signature in the list, and reports identical selectors within your input. To find out what a specific transaction does, read the calldata with the calldata decoder and check the target address with the Ethereum address checker.

    Proxies: when two contracts share a selector

    Many contracts can be swapped out. A proxy holds the data and passes every call on via delegatecall to an implementation that can be replaced later. 1.4 million such proxies were measured, and around half could be switched by a single address Salehi et al. 2023. A follow-up study describes six common patterns and found over 10,000 chains of actual replacements Li et al. 2024. For perspective: across all contracts, only 3 per cent can be swapped, and of those only 0.34 per cent ever were Qasse et al. 2025. For selectors that means: behind the same address, other functions may stand tomorrow.

    If proxy and implementation have a function with the same selector, the proxy's runs, and the implementation's cannot be reached from outside. The transparent pattern therefore separates admin and user; in the UUPS pattern the upgrade function lives in the implementation. A measurement across 36 million contracts found 54.2 per cent proxies and around 1.5 million contracts with at least one collision of functions or storage Chen et al. 2025. Paste proxy and implementation into the calculator together; it reports identical selectors across contract boundaries.

    Storage slots under EIP-1967

    If two contracts share storage and interpret it differently, storage collisions result Ruaro et al. 2024. EIP-1967 therefore puts the address of the implementation at a slot that is derived from a hash and does not coincide with any normal variable: keccak256("eip1967.proxy.implementation") − 1. If you look up a 32-byte value, these slots and the upgrade events are shown.

    EIP-1967: storage slots and events (calculated)
    WhatValue
    EIP-1967 storage slot of the implementation0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc
    EIP-1967 storage slot of the admin0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103
    EIP-1967 storage slot of the beacon0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50
    Event Upgraded(address)0xbc7cd75a20ee27fd9adebab32041f755214dbc6bffa90cc0225b39da2e5c2d3b
    Event AdminChanged(address,address)0x7e644d79422f17c01e4894b5f4f588d331ebfa28653d42ae832dc59e38c9798f
    Event BeaconUpgraded(address)0x1cf3b03a6cf19fa2baba4df148e9dcabedea7f8a5c07840e207e5c089be95d3e

    Diamonds under EIP-2535 go further: a contract assigns each selector individually to a facet. The function for this takes an array of structs with an enum, canonically diamondCut((address,uint8,bytes4[])[],address,bytes), selector 0x1f931c1c. A good example of why the calculator resolves structs and enums itself: it is easy to make a typing mistake here by hand.

    The list of known signatures

    401 signatures in 48 groups, each with source and version. The signatures come from the source files themselves, read with this tool's parser; every value below is calculated. Where a group maps an interface exactly, the interface ID under ERC-165 is shown. As of 14 November 2026.

    Solidity (built-in) 2

    Source: Solidity docs: Panic via assert and Error via require

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    Error(string)Error0x08c379a0
    Panic(uint256)Error0x4e487b71
    ERC-20 8 · ID 0x36372b07

    Source: EIP-20: Token Standard

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    totalSupply()Function0x18160ddd
    balanceOf(address)Function0x70a08231
    transfer(address,uint256)Function0xa9059cbb
    allowance(address,address)Function0xdd62ed3e
    approve(address,uint256)Function0x095ea7b3
    transferFrom(address,address,uint256)Function0x23b872dd
    Transfer(address,address,uint256)Event0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
    Approval(address,address,uint256)Event0x8c5be1e5ebec7d5bd14f71427d1e84f3dd0314c0f7b2291e5b200ac8c7c3b925
    ERC-20 Metadata 3 · ID 0xa219a025

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: IERC20Metadata

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    name()Function0x06fdde03
    symbol()Function0x95d89b41
    decimals()Function0x313ce567
    ERC-20 Burnable 2

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: ERC20Burnable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    burn(uint256)Function0x42966c68
    burnFrom(address,uint256)Function0x79cc6790
    ERC-20 (OpenZeppelin 4.x) 7

    Source: OpenZeppelin v4.9.6: ERC20 and ERC20PresetMinterPauser

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    increaseAllowance(address,uint256)Function0x39509351
    decreaseAllowance(address,uint256)Function0xa457c2d7
    mint(address,uint256)Function0x40c10f19
    pause()Function0x8456cb59
    unpause()Function0x3f4ba83a
    MINTER_ROLE()Function0xd5391393
    PAUSER_ROLE()Function0xe63ab1e9
    ERC-2612 Permit 6 · ID 0x9d8ff7da

    Source: EIP-2612: Permit Extension for EIP-20 Signed Approvals

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)Function0xd505accf
    nonces(address)Function0x7ecebe00
    DOMAIN_SEPARATOR()Function0x3644e515
    ERC2612ExpiredSignature(uint256)Error0x62791302
    ERC2612InvalidSigner(address,address)Error0x4b800e46
    InvalidAccountNonce(address,uint256)Error0x752d88c0
    ERC-6093 errors 21

    Source: EIP-6093: Custom errors for commonly-used tokens

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    ERC20InsufficientBalance(address,uint256,uint256)Error0xe450d38c
    ERC20InvalidSender(address)Error0x96c6fd1e
    ERC20InvalidReceiver(address)Error0xec442f05
    ERC20InsufficientAllowance(address,uint256,uint256)Error0xfb8f41b2
    ERC20InvalidApprover(address)Error0xe602df05
    ERC20InvalidSpender(address)Error0x94280d62
    ERC721InvalidOwner(address)Error0x89c62b64
    ERC721NonexistentToken(uint256)Error0x7e273289
    ERC721IncorrectOwner(address,uint256,address)Error0x64283d7b
    ERC721InvalidSender(address)Error0x73c6ac6e
    ERC721InvalidReceiver(address)Error0x64a0ae92
    ERC721InsufficientApproval(address,uint256)Error0x177e802f
    ERC721InvalidApprover(address)Error0xa9fbf51f
    ERC721InvalidOperator(address)Error0x5b08ba18
    ERC1155InsufficientBalance(address,uint256,uint256,uint256)Error0x03dee4c5
    ERC1155InvalidSender(address)Error0x01a83514
    ERC1155InvalidReceiver(address)Error0x57f447ce
    ERC1155MissingApprovalForAll(address,address)Error0xe237d922
    ERC1155InvalidApprover(address)Error0x3e31884e
    ERC1155InvalidOperator(address)Error0xced3e100
    ERC1155InvalidArrayLength(uint256,uint256)Error0x5b059991
    ERC-165 1 · ID 0x01ffc9a7

    Source: EIP-165: Standard Interface Detection

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    supportsInterface(bytes4)Function0x01ffc9a7
    ERC-721 12 · ID 0x80ac58cd

    Source: EIP-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    balanceOf(address)Function0x70a08231
    ownerOf(uint256)Function0x6352211e
    safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)Function0xb88d4fde
    safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)Function0x42842e0e
    transferFrom(address,address,uint256)Function0x23b872dd
    approve(address,uint256)Function0x095ea7b3
    setApprovalForAll(address,bool)Function0xa22cb465
    getApproved(uint256)Function0x081812fc
    isApprovedForAll(address,address)Function0xe985e9c5
    Transfer(address,address,uint256)Event0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
    Approval(address,address,uint256)Event0x8c5be1e5ebec7d5bd14f71427d1e84f3dd0314c0f7b2291e5b200ac8c7c3b925
    ApprovalForAll(address,address,bool)Event0x17307eab39ab6107e8899845ad3d59bd9653f200f220920489ca2b5937696c31
    ERC-721 Metadata 3 · ID 0x5b5e139f

    Source: EIP-721: Metadata extension

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    name()Function0x06fdde03
    symbol()Function0x95d89b41
    tokenURI(uint256)Function0xc87b56dd
    ERC-721 Enumerable 3 · ID 0x780e9d63

    Source: EIP-721: Enumeration extension

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    totalSupply()Function0x18160ddd
    tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256)Function0x2f745c59
    tokenByIndex(uint256)Function0x4f6ccce7
    ERC-721 Receiver 1 · ID 0x150b7a02

    Source: EIP-721: ERC721TokenReceiver

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    onERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes)Function0x150b7a02
    ERC-1155 10 · ID 0xd9b67a26

    Source: EIP-1155: Multi Token Standard

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    balanceOf(address,uint256)Function0x00fdd58e
    balanceOfBatch(address[],uint256[])Function0x4e1273f4
    setApprovalForAll(address,bool)Function0xa22cb465
    isApprovedForAll(address,address)Function0xe985e9c5
    safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0xf242432a
    safeBatchTransferFrom(address,address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes)Function0x2eb2c2d6
    TransferSingle(address,address,address,uint256,uint256)Event0xc3d58168c5ae7397731d063d5bbf3d657854427343f4c083240f7aacaa2d0f62
    TransferBatch(address,address,address,uint256[],uint256[])Event0x4a39dc06d4c0dbc64b70af90fd698a233a518aa5d07e595d983b8c0526c8f7fb
    ApprovalForAll(address,address,bool)Event0x17307eab39ab6107e8899845ad3d59bd9653f200f220920489ca2b5937696c31
    URI(string,uint256)Event0x6bb7ff708619ba0610cba295a58592e0451dee2622938c8755667688daf3529b
    ERC-1155 Metadata URI 1 · ID 0x0e89341c

    Source: EIP-1155: Metadata extension

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    uri(uint256)Function0x0e89341c
    ERC-1155 Receiver 2 · ID 0x4e2312e0

    Source: EIP-1155: ERC1155TokenReceiver

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    onERC1155Received(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0xf23a6e61
    onERC1155BatchReceived(address,address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes)Function0xbc197c81
    ERC-2981 Royalties 1 · ID 0x2a55205a

    Source: EIP-2981: NFT Royalty Standard

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    royaltyInfo(uint256,uint256)Function0x2a55205a
    ERC-4906 metadata update 2

    Source: EIP-4906: EIP-721 Metadata Update Extension

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    MetadataUpdate(uint256)Event0xf8e1a15aba9398e019f0b49df1a4fde98ee17ae345cb5f6b5e2c27f5033e8ce7
    BatchMetadataUpdate(uint256,uint256)Event0x6bd5c950a8d8df17f772f5af37cb3655737899cbf903264b9795592da439661c
    ERC-7572 contractURI 2

    Source: ERC-7572: Contract-level metadata via contractURI()

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    contractURI()Function0xe8a3d485
    ContractURIUpdated()Event0xa5d4097edda6d87cb9329af83fb3712ef77eeb13738ffe43cc35a4ce305ad962
    ERC-4626 Vault 18

    Source: EIP-4626: Tokenized Vaults

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    asset()Function0x38d52e0f
    totalAssets()Function0x01e1d114
    convertToShares(uint256)Function0xc6e6f592
    convertToAssets(uint256)Function0x07a2d13a
    maxDeposit(address)Function0x402d267d
    previewDeposit(uint256)Function0xef8b30f7
    deposit(uint256,address)Function0x6e553f65
    maxMint(address)Function0xc63d75b6
    previewMint(uint256)Function0xb3d7f6b9
    mint(uint256,address)Function0x94bf804d
    maxWithdraw(address)Function0xce96cb77
    previewWithdraw(uint256)Function0x0a28a477
    withdraw(uint256,address,address)Function0xb460af94
    maxRedeem(address)Function0xd905777e
    previewRedeem(uint256)Function0x4cdad506
    redeem(uint256,address,address)Function0xba087652
    Deposit(address,address,uint256,uint256)Event0xdcbc1c05240f31ff3ad067ef1ee35ce4997762752e3a095284754544f4c709d7
    Withdraw(address,address,address,uint256,uint256)Event0xfbde797d201c681b91056529119e0b02407c7bb96a4a2c75c01fc9667232c8db
    ERC-1271 signature validation 1

    Source: EIP-1271: Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    isValidSignature(bytes32,bytes)Function0x1626ba7e
    ERC-5267 EIP-712 domain 2

    Source: EIP-5267: Retrieval of EIP-712 domain

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    eip712Domain()Function0x84b0196e
    EIP712DomainChanged()Event0x0a6387c9ea3628b88a633bb4f3b151770f70085117a15f9bf3787cda53f13d31
    Ownable 6

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: Ownable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    owner()Function0x8da5cb5b
    renounceOwnership()Function0x715018a6
    transferOwnership(address)Function0xf2fde38b
    OwnershipTransferred(address,address)Event0x8be0079c531659141344cd1fd0a4f28419497f9722a3daafe3b4186f6b6457e0
    OwnableUnauthorizedAccount(address)Error0x118cdaa7
    OwnableInvalidOwner(address)Error0x1e4fbdf7
    Ownable2Step 3

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: Ownable2Step

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    pendingOwner()Function0xe30c3978
    acceptOwnership()Function0x79ba5097
    OwnershipTransferStarted(address,address)Event0x38d16b8cac22d99fc7c124b9cd0de2d3fa1faef420bfe791d8c362d765e22700
    AccessControl 10 · ID 0x7965db0b

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: IAccessControl

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    hasRole(bytes32,address)Function0x91d14854
    getRoleAdmin(bytes32)Function0x248a9ca3
    grantRole(bytes32,address)Function0x2f2ff15d
    revokeRole(bytes32,address)Function0xd547741f
    renounceRole(bytes32,address)Function0x36568abe
    RoleAdminChanged(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32)Event0xbd79b86ffe0ab8e8776151514217cd7cacd52c909f66475c3af44e129f0b00ff
    RoleGranted(bytes32,address,address)Event0x2f8788117e7eff1d82e926ec794901d17c78024a50270940304540a733656f0d
    RoleRevoked(bytes32,address,address)Event0xf6391f5c32d9c69d2a47ea670b442974b53935d1edc7fd64eb21e047a839171b
    AccessControlUnauthorizedAccount(address,bytes32)Error0xe2517d3f
    AccessControlBadConfirmation()Error0x6697b232
    AccessControl role 1

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: AccessControl

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE()Function0xa217fddf
    AccessControlEnumerable 2 · ID 0x5a05180f

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: IAccessControlEnumerable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    getRoleMember(bytes32,uint256)Function0x9010d07c
    getRoleMemberCount(bytes32)Function0xca15c873
    Pausable 5

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: Pausable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    paused()Function0x5c975abb
    Paused(address)Event0x62e78cea01bee320cd4e420270b5ea74000d11b0c9f74754ebdbfc544b05a258
    Unpaused(address)Event0x5db9ee0a495bf2e6ff9c91a7834c1ba4fdd244a5e8aa4e537bd38aeae4b073aa
    EnforcedPause()Error0xd93c0665
    ExpectedPause()Error0x8dfc202b
    Votes (Governance) 9

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: IVotes

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    getVotes(address)Function0x9ab24eb0
    getPastVotes(address,uint256)Function0x3a46b1a8
    getPastTotalSupply(uint256)Function0x8e539e8c
    delegates(address)Function0x587cde1e
    delegate(address)Function0x5c19a95c
    delegateBySig(address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)Function0xc3cda520
    DelegateChanged(address,address,address)Event0x3134e8a2e6d97e929a7e54011ea5485d7d196dd5f0ba4d4ef95803e8e3fc257f
    DelegateVotesChanged(address,uint256,uint256)Event0xdec2bacdd2f05b59de34da9b523dff8be42e5e38e818c82fdb0bae774387a724
    VotesExpiredSignature(uint256)Error0x4683af0e
    OpenZeppelin helper errors 14

    Source: OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: Address, Errors, SafeERC20, ECDSA, ReentrancyGuard, Initializable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    Initialized(uint64)Event0xc7f505b2f371ae2175ee4913f4499e1f2633a7b5936321eed1cdaeb6115181d2
    ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall()Error0x3ee5aeb5
    AddressEmptyCode(address)Error0x9996b315
    FailedCall()Error0xd6bda275
    FailedDeployment()Error0xb06ebf3d
    InsufficientBalance(uint256,uint256)Error0xcf479181
    MissingPrecompile(address)Error0x42b01bce
    SafeERC20FailedOperation(address)Error0x5274afe7
    SafeERC20FailedDecreaseAllowance(address,uint256,uint256)Error0xe570110f
    ECDSAInvalidSignature()Error0xf645eedf
    ECDSAInvalidSignatureLength(uint256)Error0xfce698f7
    ECDSAInvalidSignatureS(bytes32)Error0xd78bce0c
    InvalidInitialization()Error0xf92ee8a9
    NotInitializing()Error0xd7e6bcf8
    Proxy (EIP-1967, UUPS, Transparent, Beacon) 17

    Source: EIP-1967 and OpenZeppelin v5.4.0: proxy/

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)Function0x4f1ef286
    proxiableUUID()Function0x52d1902d
    UPGRADE_INTERFACE_VERSION()Function0xad3cb1cc
    upgradeAndCall(address,address,bytes)Function0x9623609d
    implementation()Function0x5c60da1b
    upgradeTo(address)Function0x3659cfe6
    Upgraded(address)Event0xbc7cd75a20ee27fd9adebab32041f755214dbc6bffa90cc0225b39da2e5c2d3b
    AdminChanged(address,address)Event0x7e644d79422f17c01e4894b5f4f588d331ebfa28653d42ae832dc59e38c9798f
    BeaconUpgraded(address)Event0x1cf3b03a6cf19fa2baba4df148e9dcabedea7f8a5c07840e207e5c089be95d3e
    ERC1967InvalidImplementation(address)Error0x4c9c8ce3
    ERC1967InvalidAdmin(address)Error0x62e77ba2
    ERC1967InvalidBeacon(address)Error0x64ced0ec
    ERC1967NonPayable()Error0xb398979f
    UUPSUnauthorizedCallContext()Error0xe07c8dba
    UUPSUnsupportedProxiableUUID(bytes32)Error0xaa1d49a4
    ProxyDeniedAdminAccess()Error0xd2b576ec
    BeaconInvalidImplementation(address)Error0x847ac564
    Proxy (OpenZeppelin 4.x) 6

    Source: OpenZeppelin v4.9.6: TransparentUpgradeableProxy, Initializable

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    admin()Function0xf851a440
    implementation()Function0x5c60da1b
    changeAdmin(address)Function0x8f283970
    upgradeTo(address)Function0x3659cfe6
    upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)Function0x4f1ef286
    Initialized(uint8)Event0x7f26b83ff96e1f2b6a682f133852f6798a09c465da95921460cefb3847402498
    EIP-2535 DiamondCut 2 · ID 0x1f931c1c

    Source: EIP-2535: Diamonds, Multi-Facet Proxy

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    diamondCut((address,uint8,bytes4[])[],address,bytes)Function0x1f931c1c
    DiamondCut((address,uint8,bytes4[])[],address,bytes)Event0x8faa70878671ccd212d20771b795c50af8fd3ff6cf27f4bde57e5d4de0aeb673
    EIP-2535 DiamondLoupe 4 · ID 0x48e2b093

    Source: EIP-2535: Diamonds, Loupe functions

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    facets()Function0x7a0ed627
    facetFunctionSelectors(address)Function0xadfca15e
    facetAddresses()Function0x52ef6b2c
    facetAddress(bytes4)Function0xcdffacc6
    Multicall3 16

    Source: Multicall3 (mds1/multicall3)

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    aggregate((address,bytes)[])Function0x252dba42
    tryAggregate(bool,(address,bytes)[])Function0xbce38bd7
    tryBlockAndAggregate(bool,(address,bytes)[])Function0x399542e9
    blockAndAggregate((address,bytes)[])Function0xc3077fa9
    aggregate3((address,bool,bytes)[])Function0x82ad56cb
    aggregate3Value((address,bool,uint256,bytes)[])Function0x174dea71
    getBlockHash(uint256)Function0xee82ac5e
    getBlockNumber()Function0x42cbb15c
    getCurrentBlockCoinbase()Function0xa8b0574e
    getCurrentBlockDifficulty()Function0x72425d9d
    getCurrentBlockGasLimit()Function0x86d516e8
    getCurrentBlockTimestamp()Function0x0f28c97d
    getEthBalance(address)Function0x4d2301cc
    getLastBlockHash()Function0x27e86d6e
    getBasefee()Function0x3e64a696
    getChainId()Function0x3408e470
    Multicall (OpenZeppelin, Uniswap) 3

    Source: Uniswap swap-router-contracts: IMulticallExtended

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    multicall(bytes[])Function0xac9650d8
    multicall(uint256,bytes[])Function0x5ae401dc
    multicall(bytes32,bytes[])Function0x1f0464d1
    Uniswap V2 Router 24

    Source: Uniswap v2-periphery: IUniswapV2Router02

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    factory()Function0xc45a0155
    WETH()Function0xad5c4648
    addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)Function0xe8e33700
    addLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)Function0xf305d719
    removeLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)Function0xbaa2abde
    removeLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)Function0x02751cec
    removeLiquidityWithPermit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)Function0x2195995c
    removeLiquidityETHWithPermit(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)Function0xded9382a
    swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x38ed1739
    swapTokensForExactTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x8803dbee
    swapExactETHForTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x7ff36ab5
    swapTokensForExactETH(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x4a25d94a
    swapExactTokensForETH(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x18cbafe5
    swapETHForExactTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0xfb3bdb41
    quote(uint256,uint256,uint256)Function0xad615dec
    getAmountOut(uint256,uint256,uint256)Function0x054d50d4
    getAmountIn(uint256,uint256,uint256)Function0x85f8c259
    getAmountsOut(uint256,address[])Function0xd06ca61f
    getAmountsIn(uint256,address[])Function0x1f00ca74
    removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)Function0xaf2979eb
    removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)Function0x5b0d5984
    swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x5c11d795
    swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0xb6f9de95
    swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)Function0x791ac947
    Uniswap V2 Pair 19

    Source: Uniswap v2-core: IUniswapV2Pair

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    PERMIT_TYPEHASH()Function0x30adf81f
    MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY()Function0xba9a7a56
    factory()Function0xc45a0155
    token0()Function0x0dfe1681
    token1()Function0xd21220a7
    getReserves()Function0x0902f1ac
    price0CumulativeLast()Function0x5909c0d5
    price1CumulativeLast()Function0x5a3d5493
    kLast()Function0x7464fc3d
    mint(address)Function0x6a627842
    burn(address)Function0x89afcb44
    swap(uint256,uint256,address,bytes)Function0x022c0d9f
    skim(address)Function0xbc25cf77
    sync()Function0xfff6cae9
    initialize(address,address)Function0x485cc955
    Mint(address,uint256,uint256)Event0x4c209b5fc8ad50758f13e2e1088ba56a560dff690a1c6fef26394f4c03821c4f
    Burn(address,uint256,uint256,address)Event0xdccd412f0b1252819cb1fd330b93224ca42612892bb3f4f789976e6d81936496
    Swap(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address)Event0xd78ad95fa46c994b6551d0da85fc275fe613ce37657fb8d5e3d130840159d822
    Sync(uint112,uint112)Event0x1c411e9a96e071241c2f21f7726b17ae89e3cab4c78be50e062b03a9fffbbad1
    Uniswap V2 Factory 10

    Source: Uniswap v2-core: IUniswapV2Factory, IUniswapV2Callee

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    feeTo()Function0x017e7e58
    feeToSetter()Function0x094b7415
    getPair(address,address)Function0xe6a43905
    allPairs(uint256)Function0x1e3dd18b
    allPairsLength()Function0x574f2ba3
    createPair(address,address)Function0xc9c65396
    setFeeTo(address)Function0xf46901ed
    setFeeToSetter(address)Function0xa2e74af6
    uniswapV2Call(address,uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0x10d1e85c
    PairCreated(address,address,address,uint256)Event0x0d3648bd0f6ba80134a33ba9275ac585d9d315f0ad8355cddefde31afa28d0e9
    Uniswap V3 Pool 36

    Source: Uniswap v3-core: IUniswapV3Pool (Actions, State, Immutables, DerivedState, Events)

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    initialize(uint160)Function0xf637731d
    mint(address,int24,int24,uint128,bytes)Function0x3c8a7d8d
    collect(address,int24,int24,uint128,uint128)Function0x4f1eb3d8
    burn(int24,int24,uint128)Function0xa34123a7
    swap(address,bool,int256,uint160,bytes)Function0x128acb08
    flash(address,uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0x490e6cbc
    increaseObservationCardinalityNext(uint16)Function0x32148f67
    slot0()Function0x3850c7bd
    feeGrowthGlobal0X128()Function0xf3058399
    feeGrowthGlobal1X128()Function0x46141319
    protocolFees()Function0x1ad8b03b
    liquidity()Function0x1a686502
    ticks(int24)Function0xf30dba93
    tickBitmap(int16)Function0x5339c296
    positions(bytes32)Function0x514ea4bf
    observations(uint256)Function0x252c09d7
    factory()Function0xc45a0155
    token0()Function0x0dfe1681
    token1()Function0xd21220a7
    fee()Function0xddca3f43
    tickSpacing()Function0xd0c93a7c
    maxLiquidityPerTick()Function0x70cf754a
    observe(uint32[])Function0x883bdbfd
    snapshotCumulativesInside(int24,int24)Function0xa38807f2
    uniswapV3SwapCallback(int256,int256,bytes)Function0xfa461e33
    uniswapV3MintCallback(uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0xd3487997
    uniswapV3FlashCallback(uint256,uint256,bytes)Function0xe9cbafb0
    Initialize(uint160,int24)Event0x98636036cb66a9c19a37435efc1e90142190214e8abeb821bdba3f2990dd4c95
    Mint(address,address,int24,int24,uint128,uint256,uint256)Event0x7a53080ba414158be7ec69b987b5fb7d07dee101fe85488f0853ae16239d0bde
    Collect(address,address,int24,int24,uint128,uint128)Event0x70935338e69775456a85ddef226c395fb668b63fa0115f5f20610b388e6ca9c0
    Burn(address,int24,int24,uint128,uint256,uint256)Event0x0c396cd989a39f4459b5fa1aed6a9a8dcdbc45908acfd67e028cd568da98982c
    Swap(address,address,int256,int256,uint160,uint128,int24)Event0xc42079f94a6350d7e6235f29174924f928cc2ac818eb64fed8004e115fbcca67
    Flash(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)Event0xbdbdb71d7860376ba52b25a5028beea23581364a40522f6bcfb86bb1f2dca633
    IncreaseObservationCardinalityNext(uint16,uint16)Event0xac49e518f90a358f652e4400164f05a5d8f7e35e7747279bc3a93dbf584e125a
    SetFeeProtocol(uint8,uint8,uint8,uint8)Event0x973d8d92bb299f4af6ce49b52a8adb85ae46b9f214c4c4fc06ac77401237b133
    CollectProtocol(address,address,uint128,uint128)Event0x596b573906218d3411850b26a6b437d6c4522fdb43d2d2386263f86d50b8b151
    Uniswap V3 Factory 9

    Source: Uniswap v3-core: IUniswapV3Factory

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    owner()Function0x8da5cb5b
    feeAmountTickSpacing(uint24)Function0x22afcccb
    getPool(address,address,uint24)Function0x1698ee82
    createPool(address,address,uint24)Function0xa1671295
    setOwner(address)Function0x13af4035
    enableFeeAmount(uint24,int24)Function0x8a7c195f
    OwnerChanged(address,address)Event0xb532073b38c83145e3e5135377a08bf9aab55bc0fd7c1179cd4fb995d2a5159c
    PoolCreated(address,address,uint24,int24,address)Event0x783cca1c0412dd0d695e784568c96da2e9c22ff989357a2e8b1d9b2b4e6b7118
    FeeAmountEnabled(uint24,int24)Event0xc66a3fdf07232cdd185febcc6579d408c241b47ae2f9907d84be655141eeaecc
    Uniswap V3 SwapRouter 11

    Source: Uniswap v3-periphery ISwapRouter, IPeripheryPayments and swap-router-contracts IV3SwapRouter (SwapRouter02)

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint160))Function0x414bf389
    exactInput((bytes,address,uint256,uint256,uint256))Function0xc04b8d59
    exactOutputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint160))Function0xdb3e2198
    exactOutput((bytes,address,uint256,uint256,uint256))Function0xf28c0498
    exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))Function0x04e45aaf
    exactInput((bytes,address,uint256,uint256))Function0xb858183f
    exactOutputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))Function0x5023b4df
    exactOutput((bytes,address,uint256,uint256))Function0x09b81346
    unwrapWETH9(uint256,address)Function0x49404b7c
    refundETH()Function0x12210e8a
    sweepToken(address,uint256,address)Function0xdf2ab5bb
    Uniswap V3 positions 9

    Source: Uniswap v3-periphery: INonfungiblePositionManager

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    positions(uint256)Function0x99fbab88
    mint((address,address,uint24,int24,int24,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256))Function0x88316456
    increaseLiquidity((uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256))Function0x219f5d17
    decreaseLiquidity((uint256,uint128,uint256,uint256,uint256))Function0x0c49ccbe
    collect((uint256,address,uint128,uint128))Function0xfc6f7865
    burn(uint256)Function0x42966c68
    IncreaseLiquidity(uint256,uint128,uint256,uint256)Event0x3067048beee31b25b2f1681f88dac838c8bba36af25bfb2b7cf7473a5847e35f
    DecreaseLiquidity(uint256,uint128,uint256,uint256)Event0x26f6a048ee9138f2c0ce266f322cb99228e8d619ae2bff30c67f8dcf9d2377b4
    Collect(uint256,address,uint256,uint256)Event0x40d0efd1a53d60ecbf40971b9daf7dc90178c3aadc7aab1765632738fa8b8f01
    Uniswap Universal Router 9

    Source: Uniswap universal-router: UniversalRouter, IUniversalRouter

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256)Function0x3593564c
    execute(bytes,bytes[])Function0x24856bc3
    executeSigned(bytes,bytes[],bytes32,bytes32,bool,bytes32,bytes,uint256)Function0x44684dc3
    signedRouteContext()Function0xd04d79a2
    ExecutionFailed(uint256,bytes)Error0x2c4029e9
    ETHNotAccepted()Error0x1231ae40
    TransactionDeadlinePassed()Error0x5bf6f916
    LengthMismatch()Error0xff633a38
    InvalidEthSender()Error0x38bbd576
    Permit2 31

    Source: Uniswap permit2: IAllowanceTransfer, ISignatureTransfer, PermitErrors, SignatureVerification

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    allowance(address,address,address)Function0x927da105
    approve(address,address,uint160,uint48)Function0x87517c45
    permit(address,((address,uint160,uint48,uint48),address,uint256),bytes)Function0x2b67b570
    permit(address,((address,uint160,uint48,uint48)[],address,uint256),bytes)Function0x2a2d80d1
    transferFrom(address,address,uint160,address)Function0x36c78516
    transferFrom((address,address,uint160,address)[])Function0x0d58b1db
    lockdown((address,address)[])Function0xcc53287f
    invalidateNonces(address,address,uint48)Function0x65d9723c
    nonceBitmap(address,uint256)Function0x4fe02b44
    permitTransferFrom(((address,uint256),uint256,uint256),(address,uint256),address,bytes)Function0x30f28b7a
    permitWitnessTransferFrom(((address,uint256),uint256,uint256),(address,uint256),address,bytes32,string,bytes)Function0x137c29fe
    permitTransferFrom(((address,uint256)[],uint256,uint256),(address,uint256)[],address,bytes)Function0xedd9444b
    permitWitnessTransferFrom(((address,uint256)[],uint256,uint256),(address,uint256)[],address,bytes32,string,bytes)Function0xfe8ec1a7
    invalidateUnorderedNonces(uint256,uint256)Function0x3ff9dcb1
    DOMAIN_SEPARATOR()Function0x3644e515
    NonceInvalidation(address,address,address,uint48,uint48)Event0x55eb90d810e1700b35a8e7e25395ff7f2b2259abd7415ca2284dfb1c246418f3
    Approval(address,address,address,uint160,uint48)Event0xda9fa7c1b00402c17d0161b249b1ab8bbec047c5a52207b9c112deffd817036b
    Permit(address,address,address,uint160,uint48,uint48)Event0xc6a377bfc4eb120024a8ac08eef205be16b817020812c73223e81d1bdb9708ec
    Lockdown(address,address,address)Event0x89b1add15eff56b3dfe299ad94e01f2b52fbcb80ae1a3baea6ae8c04cb2b98a4
    UnorderedNonceInvalidation(address,uint256,uint256)Event0x3704902f963766a4e561bbaab6e6cdc1b1dd12f6e9e99648da8843b3f46b918d
    AllowanceExpired(uint256)Error0xd81b2f2e
    InsufficientAllowance(uint256)Error0xf96fb071
    ExcessiveInvalidation()Error0x24d35a26
    InvalidAmount(uint256)Error0x3728b83d
    LengthMismatch()Error0xff633a38
    SignatureExpired(uint256)Error0xcd21db4f
    InvalidNonce()Error0x756688fe
    InvalidSignatureLength()Error0x4be6321b
    InvalidSignature()Error0x8baa579f
    InvalidSigner()Error0x815e1d64
    InvalidContractSignature()Error0xb0669cbc
    Safe (Multisig) 46

    Source: Safe Smart Account v1.4.1: Safe, OwnerManager, ModuleManager, GuardManager, FallbackManager

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    setup(address[],uint256,address,bytes,address,address,uint256,address)Function0xb63e800d
    execTransaction(address,uint256,bytes,uint8,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bytes)Function0x6a761202
    checkSignatures(bytes32,bytes,bytes)Function0x934f3a11
    checkNSignatures(bytes32,bytes,bytes,uint256)Function0x12fb68e0
    approveHash(bytes32)Function0xd4d9bdcd
    domainSeparator()Function0xf698da25
    encodeTransactionData(address,uint256,bytes,uint8,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256)Function0xe86637db
    getTransactionHash(address,uint256,bytes,uint8,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256)Function0xd8d11f78
    VERSION()Function0xffa1ad74
    nonce()Function0xaffed0e0
    signedMessages(bytes32)Function0x5ae6bd37
    approvedHashes(address,bytes32)Function0x7d832974
    addOwnerWithThreshold(address,uint256)Function0x0d582f13
    removeOwner(address,address,uint256)Function0xf8dc5dd9
    swapOwner(address,address,address)Function0xe318b52b
    changeThreshold(uint256)Function0x694e80c3
    getThreshold()Function0xe75235b8
    isOwner(address)Function0x2f54bf6e
    getOwners()Function0xa0e67e2b
    enableModule(address)Function0x610b5925
    disableModule(address,address)Function0xe009cfde
    execTransactionFromModule(address,uint256,bytes,uint8)Function0x468721a7
    execTransactionFromModuleReturnData(address,uint256,bytes,uint8)Function0x5229073f
    isModuleEnabled(address)Function0x2d9ad53d
    getModulesPaginated(address,uint256)Function0xcc2f8452
    setGuard(address)Function0xe19a9dd9
    setFallbackHandler(address)Function0xf08a0323
    getStorageAt(uint256,uint256)Function0x5624b25b
    simulateAndRevert(address,bytes)Function0xb4faba09
    getChainId()Function0x3408e470
    checkTransaction(address,uint256,bytes,uint8,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bytes,address)Function0x75f0bb52
    checkAfterExecution(bytes32,bool)Function0x93271368
    SafeSetup(address,address[],uint256,address,address)Event0x141df868a6331af528e38c83b7aa03edc19be66e37ae67f9285bf4f8e3c6a1a8
    ApproveHash(bytes32,address)Event0xf2a0eb156472d1440255b0d7c1e19cc07115d1051fe605b0dce69acfec884d9c
    SignMsg(bytes32)Event0xe7f4675038f4f6034dfcbbb24c4dc08e4ebf10eb9d257d3d02c0f38d122ac6e4
    ExecutionFailure(bytes32,uint256)Event0x23428b18acfb3ea64b08dc0c1d296ea9c09702c09083ca5272e64d115b687d23
    ExecutionSuccess(bytes32,uint256)Event0x442e715f626346e8c54381002da614f62bee8d27386535b2521ec8540898556e
    AddedOwner(address)Event0x9465fa0c962cc76958e6373a993326400c1c94f8be2fe3a952adfa7f60b2ea26
    RemovedOwner(address)Event0xf8d49fc529812e9a7c5c50e69c20f0dccc0db8fa95c98bc58cc9a4f1c1299eaf
    ChangedThreshold(uint256)Event0x610f7ff2b304ae8903c3de74c60c6ab1f7d6226b3f52c5161905bb5ad4039c93
    EnabledModule(address)Event0xecdf3a3effea5783a3c4c2140e677577666428d44ed9d474a0b3a4c9943f8440
    DisabledModule(address)Event0xaab4fa2b463f581b2b32cb3b7e3b704b9ce37cc209b5fb4d77e593ace4054276
    ExecutionFromModuleSuccess(address)Event0x6895c13664aa4f67288b25d7a21d7aaa34916e355fb9b6fae0a139a9085becb8
    ExecutionFromModuleFailure(address)Event0xacd2c8702804128fdb0db2bb49f6d127dd0181c13fd45dbfe16de0930e2bd375
    ChangedGuard(address)Event0x1151116914515bc0891ff9047a6cb32cf902546f83066499bcf8ba33d2353fa2
    ChangedFallbackHandler(address)Event0x5ac6c46c93c8d0e53714ba3b53db3e7c046da994313d7ed0d192028bc7c228b0
    Safe ProxyFactory and MultiSend 6

    Source: Safe Smart Account v1.4.1: SafeProxyFactory, MultiSend

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    proxyCreationCode()Function0x53e5d935
    createProxyWithNonce(address,bytes,uint256)Function0x1688f0b9
    createChainSpecificProxyWithNonce(address,bytes,uint256)Function0xec9e80bb
    createProxyWithCallback(address,bytes,uint256,address)Function0xd18af54d
    multiSend(bytes)Function0x8d80ff0a
    ProxyCreation(address,address)Event0x4f51faf6c4561ff95f067657e43439f0f856d97c04d9ec9070a6199ad418e235
    WETH9 4

    Source: WETH9 (gnosis/canonical-weth)

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    deposit()Function0xd0e30db0
    withdraw(uint256)Function0x2e1a7d4d
    Deposit(address,uint256)Event0xe1fffcc4923d04b559f4d29a8bfc6cda04eb5b0d3c460751c2402c5c5cc9109c
    Withdrawal(address,uint256)Event0x7fcf532c15f0a6db0bd6d0e038bea71d30d808c7d98cb3bf7268a95bf5081b65
    Chainlink price feed 5

    Source: Chainlink: AggregatorV3Interface

    SignatureTypeSelector or topic0
    decimals()Function0x313ce567
    description()Function0x7284e416
    version()Function0x54fd4d50
    getRoundData(uint80)Function0x9a6fc8f5
    latestRoundData()Function0xfeaf968c

    How to check selectors in practice

    1. Take the signature from the verified source code. Not from a forum and not from a database. You can paste whole files, including struct and enum definitions, directly.
    2. Look for the selector in the bytecode. If the value is not in the contract's code, it does not have the function, whatever the interface says.
    3. For proxies, read the implementation. Its address is in the EIP-1967 storage slot. Put proxy and implementation into the calculator together and check for collisions.
    4. Filter events by topic0 and use the number of topics to determine which standard is behind them.
    5. Decode errors. Look up the first 4 bytes of the return data; the calldata decoder shows text and arguments.

    Where the calculator stops

    • No blockchain. It calculates from text. Whether a contract has a function is shown only by its bytecode.
    • Unknown types. If a struct or enum is not pasted in, it does not calculate the signature. It treats names matching the pattern IName as interfaces and says so.
    • Libraries. External library functions with storage, struct or enum parameters follow a rule of their own and are left out.
    • Reverse lookup gives a candidate. The list is curated, not complete. A match is a fitting signature, not proof.

    More tools for contracts and wallets are in the Web3 overview, including the gas calculator. How we build smart contracts and the interfaces for them is described under Web3 development.

    What the research says

    Five findings that shape the tool. The full list with its review note is further down.

    • Selectors are in the bytecode. Decompilers read over 99.98 per cent of contracts Grech et al. 2019, and signatures including types can be recovered at 98.7 per cent Chen et al. 2022. That is why the calculator points to the bytecode whenever there is any doubt.
    • A few standards cover a lot. Contracts are heavily copied He et al. 2020 and consist largely of third-party building blocks Sun et al. 2023. That is why the list is organised by library and gives the version.
    • Selectors do not prove a standard. Tokens can be recognised by their interface, those without a standard only by their behaviour Fröwis et al. 2019.
    • Proxies are common, and so are collisions. More than one in two active contracts is a proxy, and around 1.5 million show a collision Chen et al. 2025. The calculator therefore checks across contract boundaries.
    • Storage needs fixed slots. Storage collisions are a risk of their own Ruaro et al. 2024; the calculator recognises the EIP-1967 slots when you look something up.

    Using this tool from an AI assistant

    Assistants such as Claude or ChatGPT that speak the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can call this page’s calculation directly instead of rebuilding it. The server is public, needs no sign-in and stores nothing. The answer always includes the link to this page, the date of the data and the limits of the result.

    Endpoint
    https://aureum-tech.com/mcp
    Tool
    werkzeug_selektor_rechner
    Transport
    Streamable HTTP, read-only
    Inputs
    NameRequiredMeaning
    eingabeyesWhat is to be calculated or looked up, as text: a signature (“transfer(address,uint256)”), one or more lines of Solidity (“function transfer(address to, uint amount) external returns (bool);”, “event Transfer(address indexed from, …)”, “error X(uint256)”), a whole contract or an interface with struct, enum and type definitions, an ABI as JSON (including a Hardhat/Foundry artefact with “abi”) or hex values to look up (4-byte selector, 32-byte topic, calldata).

    Questions where an assistant should call it

    • “Which function selector belongs to transfer(address,uint256)?”
    • “Which function does the selector 0x095ea7b3 belong to?”
    • “What is the topic0 for event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value)?”
    • “Calculate all selectors from this ABI and check whether two functions collide.”
    • “What is the ERC-165 interface ID of this Solidity interface?”

    How the connection works and what MCP can do in your own business is explained on the page about MCP integrations.

    Common questions about selectors and topics

    What is a function selector?

    The first 4 bytes of the calldata, with which a transaction says which function of a contract should run. They are the first 4 bytes of the Keccak-256 hash of the canonical signature, that is, name and parameter types without spaces, parameter names and return values. transfer(address,uint256) becomes 0xa9059cbb, approve(address,uint256) becomes 0x095ea7b3.

    How do I calculate the selector of a function with a struct parameter?

    The struct becomes a tuple: its field types in brackets, in the order of declaration, nested structs likewise. An enum becomes uint8, a contract or interface becomes address. Uniswap V3's exactInputSingle takes a struct with eight fields and is canonically exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint160)), selector 0x414bf389. Paste the struct definition into the calculator as well and it resolves this itself.

    Why do Transfer in ERC-20 and ERC-721 have the same topic0?

    Both events are called Transfer(address,address,uint256), so the hash is the same too: 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef. Indexed parameters are not part of the signature. You can tell the two apart by the number of topics: ERC-20 indexes sender and recipient (three topics), ERC-721 also the token ID (four topics).

    Can you work back from a selector to the function?

    No, a hash cannot be reversed. You can only look up which known signature produces the same value. The calculator knows 401 signatures from common standards and libraries, public databases know millions. Because 4 bytes allow only about 4.3 billion values, matching signatures can be generated deliberately; a match is therefore a candidate, not a certainty.

    What does 0x08c379a0 mean in a failed transaction?

    0x08c379a0 is the selector of Error(string): the contract aborted with require or revert and a message that follows ABI-encoded. 0x4e487b71 stands for Panic(uint256), for example on an overflow (code 0x11) or a division by zero (0x12). Custom errors such as ERC20InsufficientBalance have their own selectors, which the calculator looks up.

    What is an interface ID under ERC-165?

    The XOR of the selectors of all functions that an interface declares itself. A contract reports through supportsInterface(bytes4) which interfaces it implements. ERC-721 has the ID 0x80ac58cd, ERC-1155 0xd9b67a26. Paste an interface into the source code and the tool calculates the ID too.

    Where does the selector calculator stop?

    It builds signatures according to the ABI specification and looks them up in a curated list. It does not read the blockchain, so it does not know whether a particular contract really has a function, and behind a proxy the implementation can change at any time. It does not calculate library functions with storage, struct or enum parameters. If you need contracts and the application around them, we develop that with you.

    What the tool is based on

    The guide values and notes above are based on these 14 scientific papers. Each one has been checked via its DOI or the publisher’s page (most recently on 14 November 2026): it exists, it has not been retracted, and its findings still hold for this question today.

    1. Chen, T.; Li, Z.; Luo, X. et al. (2022): SigRec: Automatic Recovery of Function Signatures in Smart Contracts. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 48 (8), pp. 3066–3086

      Finding Bytecode contains no type information; previous tools relied on incomplete databases of known signatures. SigRec reads selector and parameter types from the behaviour of the EVM and is right in 98.7 per cent of cases.

      In the tool Explains why the reverse lookup only gives candidates: a list knows only what someone has entered; only the bytecode gives certainty.

    2. Grech, N.; Brent, L.; Scholz, B.; Smaragdakis, Y. (2019): Gigahorse: Thorough, Declarative Decompilation of Smart Contracts. IEEE/ACM 41st International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pp. 1176–1186

      Finding A decompiler can reconstruct a readable intermediate form from the bytecode of over 99.98 per cent of published contracts without knowing the source code.

      In the tool Supports the note that a contract's selectors can be read from its bytecode even if it is not verified.

    3. Grech, N.; Lagouvardos, S.; Tsatiris, I.; Smaragdakis, Y. (2022): Elipmoc: advanced decompilation of Ethereum smart contracts. Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages 6 (OOPSLA1), pp. 1–27

      Finding The successor to Gigahorse derives the arguments and returns of functions and resolves 99.5 per cent of operands (Gigahorse: 62.8 per cent); it covers significantly more than the decompiler in the block explorer.

      In the tool Shows that parameter types are inferred from the bytecode; the calculator therefore says that a signature it finds is a candidate, not a certainty.

    4. Liu, X.; Hua, B.; Wang, Y.; Pan, Z. (2023): An Empirical Study of Smart Contract Decompilers. IEEE International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering (SANER), pp. 1–12

      Finding The first large study of five decompilers identifies recurring causes of failure and incomplete results, advising task-based tool choice over blind trust.

      In the tool Explains the limit: anyone who needs to know what a contract does needs the verified source code, not just decompiled selectors.

    5. Fröwis, M.; Fuchs, A.; Böhme, R. (2019): Detecting Token Systems on Ethereum. Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 93–112

      Finding Token contracts can be recognised from the ERC-20 interface in the bytecode (complete in the test set). Detection by behaviour found 89 per cent and also tokens that deliberately do not implement the standard.

      In the tool The calculator names matching standards for a selector but adds that selectors alone do not prove that a contract really fulfils the standard.

    6. di Angelo, M.; Salzer, G. (2020): Tokens, Types, and Standards: Identification and Utilization in Ethereum. IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPS), pp. 1–10

      Finding Token contracts are identified from the bytecode by checking which standards their functions fulfil; evaluated up to block 8,750,000 (October 2019).

      In the tool Underpins the organisation of the list by standard and the interface ID for each standard (ERC-165), with which contracts identify themselves.

    7. He, N.; Wu, L.; Wang, H.; Guo, Y.; Jiang, X. (2020): Characterizing Code Clones in the Ethereum Smart Contract Ecosystem. Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 654–675

      Finding Of 10 million contracts examined, over 96 per cent had duplicates; the ecosystem is highly uniform.

      In the tool Explains why a curated list of a few hundred standard signatures covers a large share of everyday calls.

    8. Sun, K.; Xu, Z.; Liu, C. et al. (2023): Demystifying the Composition and Code Reuse in Solidity Smart Contracts. ESEC/FSE 2023, Proceedings of the 31st ACM Joint European Software Engineering Conference, pp. 796–807

      Finding In over 350,000 contracts, more than 80 per cent of the sub-contracts came from outside sources, around 35 per cent of them interfaces for standards and protocols.

      In the tool Justifies organising the list by common libraries (OpenZeppelin, Uniswap, Safe, Permit2) and giving the source with version for each group.

    9. Chen, W.; Zhang, T.; Chen, Z.; Zheng, Z.; Lu, Y. (2020): Traveling the token world: A graph analysis of Ethereum ERC20 token ecosystem. Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, pp. 1411–1421

      Finding Over 80 per cent of ICOs used ERC-20 tokens. The study rebuilds the ecosystem from transactions and event logs and detects relationships between accounts in it.

      In the tool An example of evaluations filtering events by topic0; the calculator supplies exactly this value and points out that ERC-20 and ERC-721 have the same Transfer topic0.

    10. Salehi, M.; Clark, J.; Mannan, M. (2023): Not so Immutable: Upgradeability of Smart Contracts on Ethereum. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2022 International Workshops, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 539–554

      Finding Six patterns for swappable contracts described and measured: 1.4 million proxy contracts, of which 8,225 unique; around half could be switched by a single address.

      In the tool Justifies the section on proxies: behind one address, different code can stand later, and so different selectors.

    11. Li, X.; Yang, J.; Chen, J.; Tang, Y.; Gao, X. (2024): Characterizing Ethereum Upgradable Smart Contracts and Their Security Implications. Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024, pp. 1847–1858

      Finding The study identified six common patterns of swappable contracts, examined over 60 million contracts without source code and reconstructed 10,218 upgrade chains.

      In the tool Supports the list of proxy patterns (Transparent, UUPS, Beacon, Diamond) and the advice to watch the upgrade events Upgraded and AdminChanged.

    12. Qasse, I.; Hamdaqa, M.; Jónsson, B. Þ. (2025): Immutable in principle, upgradeable by design: exploratory study of smart contract upgradeability. Empirical Software Engineering 31 (2), Art. 39

      Finding Of over 44 million contracts, only 3 per cent showed signs of being swappable, and only 0.34 per cent of those were actually swapped.

      In the tool Puts it in perspective: most contracts are not swappable; where they are, it is worth looking at the EIP-1967 storage slot.

    13. Chen, C.-K.; Chu, W.-Y.; Tran, M. et al. (2025): Uncovering Hidden Proxy Smart Contracts for Finding Collision Vulnerabilities in Ethereum. IEEE 45th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), pp. 1099–1109

      Finding Of over 36 million active contracts (2015 to 2023), 54.2 per cent were proxies; around 1.5 million showed at least one collision of functions or storage between proxy and logic.

      In the tool Reason for the collision check across several pasted contracts: paste proxy and implementation together and the calculator reports identical selectors.

    14. Ruaro, N.; Gritti, F.; McLaughlin, R. et al. (2024): Not your Type! Detecting Storage Collision Vulnerabilities in Ethereum Smart Contracts. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2024

      Finding If two contracts share their storage via delegatecall and interpret it differently, storage collisions result; the CRUSH system examined around 14.2 million contracts and generated proof-of-concept attacks.

      In the tool Explains why EIP-1967 derives storage slots from a hash; the calculator recognises these three slots when you look something up.

    Standards, authorities and manufacturer data

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