Tool AT-W35REV. 2026-A
Check an Ethereum address: is the checksum right, and is it the right address?
An Ethereum address consists of 0x and 40 hex characters. The mix of upper and lower case is an EIP-55 checksum: if a character is mistyped, it almost never fits any more. The checker shows whether the checksum is correct, outputs the correct spelling and compares two addresses character by character, including the middle that wallets like to abbreviate. It also checks whole lists.
- free
- no sign-up
- checks in the browser
01 / CHECKER
Paste an address, read off the checksum and comparison
Checker · checksum, list and comparison
The checker reads only the characters. It cannot see whether the address belongs to the recipient, which chain the recipient uses it on or whether a contract sits there; only the recipient can confirm that to you.
The checker runs in your browser. Nothing is sent, queried or stored.
02 / CHECKSUM
How the EIP-55 checksum works
Ethereum derives the address from the public key: it is the last 20 bytes of a Keccak-256 hash, written as 40 hex characters. The format originally had no check digit like an IBAN. EIP-55 added one in 2016 without making the address longer. A second Keccak-256 hash is formed from the 40 characters in lower case. If the character at the same position in the hash is 8 to f, the letter in the address is capitalised; otherwise it stays lower case. Digits stay as they are.
On average, an address carries 15 check bits this way. According to EIP-55, a mistyped address passes the check with a probability of only 0.0247%, so about once in 4,000 cases. The catch: this works only if the address is written in mixed case. In all lower case it is the same address but without a checksum, and wallets accept it without asking. A curious special case appears in the test cases of EIP-55 itself: for some addresses the rule produces only capitals or only lower-case letters. The checker recognises these as correct too.
Research on wallet users shows how important such a check is. In a survey of 990 Bitcoin users, 22 per cent had already lost money through security incidents or their own mistakes Krombholz et al. 2017. Interviewed users name their own mistakes as one of three loss risks that guide their choice of tools Fröhlich et al. 2020. And some believe a transfer can be reversed, which it cannot Voskobojnikov et al. 2021.
| Result | Example | What you do |
|---|---|---|
| Valid, checksum correct | 0x5aAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAed | Compare with the source once more, then send. |
| Valid format, no checksum | 0x5aaeb6053f3e94c9b9a09f33669435e7ef1beaed | Use the spelling with the checksum and compare it with the source character by character. |
| Checksum incorrect | 0x5AAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAed | Get the address from the source again. Do not correct it yourself: the error is often in a different character. |
| Not a valid address | 0x5aAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAe | Check the length and the characters, for example O instead of 0. Then copy it again. |
| ENS name, not an address | name.eth | Have the recipient confirm the address behind the name. |
Examples using the test address from EIP-55; the wrong checksum has a capital A at position 2, the too-short address has 39 characters.
EIP-1191: checksum with chain ID
EIP-1191 extends the rule with the chain ID. What is hashed is then, for example, “30”, “0x” and the address. The same address thus gets a different spelling on every chain, and a wallet could notice that an address comes from another network. It never caught on. According to the document, only Rootstock (chain ID 30) and its testnet (31) use it, and its status has been “Last Call” since 2019. Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain and the other large EVM chains stay with EIP-55. The checker calculates both rules and tells you if a spelling fits the other one.
| Rule | Spelling |
|---|---|
| EIP-55 (Ethereum and common EVM chains) | 0x5aAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAed |
| EIP-1191, chain ID 30 (Rootstock) | 0x5aaEB6053f3e94c9b9a09f33669435E7ef1bEAeD |
| EIP-1191, chain ID 31 (Rootstock testnet) | 0x5aAeb6053F3e94c9b9A09F33669435E7EF1BEaEd |
Calculated with the rules from ERC-55 and ERC-1191, as of 14 November 2026. The tool’s test covers all test cases from both documents.
03 / MIX-UPS
Similar addresses in your history: address poisoning
Hardly anyone types out 40 characters. You copy the address, and often from your own history of recent transfers. That is exactly where fraudsters strike Tsuchiya et al. 2025. They generate an address whose beginning and end match an address you have dealt with before. Then they put that address into your history: with a tiny transfer, a transfer of zero tokens or a fake token with the same name. This usually happens a few minutes after a genuine transfer. Wallets and block explorers abbreviate addresses to the start and end, so both look the same Guan and Li 2024.
This is not a fringe phenomenon. Over two years, Tsuchiya and colleagues counted 270 million such attempts against 17 million accounts on Ethereum and BNB Chain, with at least 83.8 million US dollars in losses. For Ethereum alone, Guan and Li confirmed around 90 million US dollars in losses, mainly among holders of USDC and USDT. At times, an eighth of all gas consumption on Ethereum went on the fake transfers Chen et al. 2025. Zero and tiny amounts from strangers in your own history are therefore no accident.
Fig. 1 · A is the test address from EIP-55, B an invented address with the same start and end. The hatching between the rows appears under every group with at least one differing character.
The checksum does not help here. The similar address is a genuine, valid address with a correct checksum. Only comparing all 40 characters helps, and the eye is not very reliable for that. With hex strings, test participants overlooked partly matching forgeries more often than with other representations Dechand et al. 2016. Dangerous errors increased with length, especially with very similar values Turner et al. 2023. Anyone who has to pick the right one from several similar entries gets it wrong especially often Tan et al. 2017. That is why the checker compares by machine and marks every difference, instead of putting two long strings side by side for you.
When two addresses count as similar
The checker adopts the rule from the measurement by Tsuchiya and colleagues: at least 3 matching characters at the start and 4 at the end, with a different middle. By chance this rarely happens. The probability that two among r different addresses match like this is about 1 − e^(−r² ÷ (2 × 16^7)). With a list of 1,000 addresses, a hit is therefore still suspicious.
If two addresses differ in only one or two characters, the checker reports a typo instead. Imitation addresses differ in almost the whole middle, because the effort grows sixteen-fold with every forced character. Making more than the start and end match is not worthwhile for the attackers.
A warning works best at the point where the decision is made Xu et al. 2026. That is why it appears here directly in the comparison result. In a wallet it belongs where the recipient address is chosen; this is how we build it into applications under Web3 development.
| Addresses | Chance | in other words |
|---|---|---|
| 10 | 0,00002 % | about 1 in 5,368,700 |
| 100 | 0,00186 % | about 1 in 53,700 |
| 1.000 | 0,19 % | about 1 in 537 |
| 10.000 | 17 % | about 1 in 6 |
04 / SPECIAL CASES
Zero address, burn address, ENS names and other special cases
Some inputs are valid addresses that you still never want to send to. Others look like an address but are something else. The checker recognises the most common cases and says so.
| Input | What it is | What is behind it |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0000…0000 (40 zeros) | Zero address | Belongs to nobody. Token contracts use it as the sender when creating tokens and as the recipient when destroying them; whatever you send there is lost. |
| 0x000…000dEaD | Burn address 0x…dEaD | Commonly used to destroy tokens deliberately. No key to it is known; whatever arrives there is permanently out of circulation. |
| 0x000…0001 to 0x000…0011, 0x000…0100 | Precompiled contracts | Built-in calculation functions of the chain (ecRecover, SHA2-256 and others), not accounts. Whatever goes there is lost. |
| name.eth | ENS name | Points to an address that the owner can change. Recognised, not resolved. |
| arb1:0x… | Address with chain prefix (EIP-3770) | The prefix names the chain and is not part of the address. The checker names the chain and checks the rest. |
| ethereum:0x… | Payment link (EIP-681) | Often found in QR codes. With “/transfer?address=…” the first address is the token contract; the recipient comes last. |
| 0x and 64 hex characters | Hash, not an address | The identifier of a transaction, or a private key. That does not belong in any form. |
| T… (34 characters), bc1… | Address on another blockchain | Tron, Bitcoin and others have their own formats. The checker says what it looks like. |
Precompiled contracts according to EIP-4844, EIP-2537 (Pectra, May 2025) and EIP-7951 (Fusaka, December 2025), as of 14 November 2026.
ENS names: recognised, not resolved
An ENS name such as “name.eth” points to an address. Which one that currently is is recorded on Ethereum; to find out, this page would have to query it there, and it deliberately sends nothing. The owner of a name can switch it to a different address at any time. There are also similarly spelled names belonging to other owners: a study of 4.9 million names found more of them every year, thousands of transfers to them and no defence in the wallets Muzammil et al. 2024. Especially treacherous are letters from other scripts that resemble Latin ones, such as the Cyrillic “а”. For domains, thousands of such imitations were registered for fraud Quinkert et al. 2019. The checker therefore lists every character outside a to z and 0 to 9 with its Unicode number.
For recurring payments: have the recipient confirm the address behind the name once and save it in your wallet’s address book.
Chain prefixes and payment links
Some applications copy addresses with a prefix in front, for example “arb1:0x…” for Arbitrum. EIP-3770 governs this: the prefix names the chain and is not part of the address. The checker shows which chain is meant and checks the address behind it.
QR codes often contain a payment link according to EIP-681 that starts with “ethereum:”. There is a trap in token transfers: with “ethereum:0x…/transfer?address=0x…” the first address is the token contract, and the recipient appears only in the “address” parameter. In this case the checker takes the recipient address and says so.
| Prefix | Chain | Chain ID |
|---|---|---|
| eth: | Ethereum Mainnet | 1 |
| oeth: | OP Mainnet | 10 |
| bnb: | BNB Smart Chain | 56 |
| gno: | Gnosis | 100 |
| pol: | Polygon | 137 |
| base: | Base | 8453 |
| arb1: | Arbitrum One | 42161 |
| sep: | Ethereum Sepolia (testnet) | 11155111 |
| rsk: | Rootstock Mainnet | 30 |
Prefixes from ethereum-lists/chains, retrieved on 14 November 2026.
05 / CHAINS
One address, many chains
An address does not reveal which chain it is used on. Many users imagine it differently, and wallets and exchanges hardly catch such misconceptions Mai et al. 2020. Even experienced users often know only roughly how the protocol works Gao et al. 2016. So here is a short summary.
- An account with a key is valid everywhere. If you create your wallet from a seed phrase, you have the same address on Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain and the other EVM chains. Money that arrives on the wrong one of these chains is not gone; the owner just has to add the chain to their wallet.
- Exchanges accept only certain networks. A deposit address is valid for the networks the exchange names for it. What arrives through another network is often not credited, and whether it can be recovered is up to the exchange.
- A contract exists only where it was deployed. A multisig or another contract may have no code at the same address on another chain. Whatever goes there does not reach the owner of the contract.
Contract or wallet? You cannot tell from the address
Accounts with a key and contracts have the same format, 20 bytes as 40 hex characters. Only a query to the chain (eth_getCode) or a block explorer shows whether there is code at an address. Since the Pectra update in May 2025, the boundary has blurred further: under EIP-7702, an account with a key can also store code. This checker deliberately queries nothing and therefore does not say what is behind an address. What a transaction to a contract actually triggers is shown by the calldata decoder.
06 / METHOD
How to get the money to the right address
- Get the address from the source. From the invoice, the contract or the recipient’s message, not from the transaction history.
- Check the checksum. Written in mixed case and recognised as valid by the checker or wallet? If it is all lower case, use the version with the checksum.
- Compare the whole thing. All 40 characters, not just the start and end. On the phone, read it out in groups of four.
- Clarify the chain. Which network does the recipient expect the money on? With exchanges, this is shown on the deposit screen.
- For larger amounts, send a little first. Have the recipient confirm receipt and take the address for the second transfer from the source again. It is right after the first transfer that similar addresses appear in your history.
- Save checked addresses. In the wallet’s address book, with a name. Next time, that is the source.
Where the checker stops
- Characters, not ownership. A valid checksum means: not mistyped. Only the recipient knows who owns the address.
- No queries. ENS names are not resolved, balances and code are not read. That would need a connection to an Ethereum node, and this page sends nothing.
- Wrong checksum, no correction. The spelling it outputs is then only the checksum of the characters entered. The correct address may be completely different.
- Other formats only roughly recognised. Whether something is a Tron or Bitcoin address, the checker estimates from the start and length; only the Ethereum format is actually checked.
If you check address lists for an allowlist, the checker returns the cleaned list with checksums; the Merkle allowlist generator builds the root and proofs from it. All the tools around Ethereum are under Web3 tools. If your application should check addresses before sending, with an address book, chain notice and a warning about similar addresses, we develop that under Web3 development.
07 / RESEARCH
What the research says
The notes in the checker are based on peer-reviewed studies. The most important findings are below; the full list with review notes follows further down.
- Similar addresses are big business. 270 million attempts in two years, recognised by the same start and end Tsuchiya et al. 2025. The checker adopts this rule.
- The abbreviated display is the weak point. The attackers exploit the fact that wallets and explorers show only the start and end Guan and Li 2024. The checker always shows and compares all 40 characters.
- People are bad at comparing long strings. The longer and more similar they are, the more critical errors occur Turner et al. 2023, especially with hex strings Dechand et al. 2016. That is why the checker marks the differences itself.
- Warnings work at the point of decision. Where in the process a warning appears determines how effective it is Xu et al. 2026.
- Your own mistakes cost money. 22 per cent of respondents had already lost money, including through their own mistakes Krombholz et al. 2017; some believe transfers can be reversed Voskobojnikov et al. 2021.
- Names do not fully solve the problem. ENS names are imitated too Muzammil et al. 2024, and look-alike characters make that especially hard to spot Quinkert et al. 2019.
08 / FOR AI ASSISTANTS
Using this tool from an AI assistant
Assistants such as Claude or ChatGPT that speak the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can call this page’s calculation directly instead of rebuilding it. The server is public, needs no sign-in and stores nothing. The answer always includes the link to this page, the date of the data and the limits of the result.
- Endpoint
https://aureum-tech.com/mcp- Tool
werkzeug_eth_adresse_pruefen- Transport
- Streamable HTTP, read-only
| Name | Required | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
adressen | yes | One or more inputs, one address per entry (0x and 40 hex characters), also with a chain prefix according to EIP-3770 (“arb1:0x…”), as a payment link according to EIP-681 (“ethereum:0x…”) or as an ENS name (“name.eth”). At most 1000. |
vergleichen_mit | no | Optional: a second address. The first entry in “adressen” is then compared with it character by character, with a warning about look-alike addresses. |
chain_id | no | Optional: chain ID according to EIP-155. Only 30 and 31 (Rootstock) change the checksum (EIP-1191); all other chains, including Ethereum (1), use EIP-55. EIP-55 if omitted. |
Questions where an assistant should call it
- “Is 0x5aAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAed a valid Ethereum address?”
- “Are these two addresses really the same, or only identical at the start and end?”
- “Check my list of 200 recipient addresses for typos, duplicates and look-alike entries.”
- “My wallet reports ‘bad address checksum’. What is wrong with the address?”
How the connection works and what MCP can do in your own business is explained on the page about MCP integrations.
09 / COMMON QUESTIONS
Common questions about Ethereum addresses
How do I tell whether an Ethereum address is valid?
An Ethereum address starts with 0x, followed by exactly 40 characters from 0 to 9 and a to f. If upper and lower case are mixed, that is an EIP-55 checksum, and it can be recalculated. If it matches, the address is very probably not mistyped. The checker on this page recalculates it in your browser, for example for 0x5aAeb6053F3E94C9b9A09f33669435E7Ef1BeAed.
Why does an Ethereum address have upper and lower case letters?
The capitalisation is the checksum. Under EIP-55, a letter is capitalised if the character at the same position in the Keccak-256 hash of the lower-case address is 8 to f. A typo changes the hash, and the capitalisation no longer fits: according to EIP-55, a mistyped address slips through with a probability of only 0.0247%, about once in 4,000 cases.
Is an Ethereum address written in lower case wrong?
No. Upper and lower case do not change the address; only the checksum is missing. Wallets accept such addresses, but a typo goes unnoticed. The checker outputs the spelling with the checksum; compare it once with the source, character by character, and then use that version.
What does “invalid checksum” or “bad address checksum” mean?
The address is written in mixed case, but the capitalisation does not match the checksum. Usually a character has been mistyped or lost when copying, and often a different one from the one whose capitalisation is off. Get the address from the source again. If it comes from a Rootstock wallet, it may be written according to EIP-1191; the checker recognises that.
What is address poisoning?
Fraudsters generate an address whose beginning and end match an address you have already sent to, and put it into your history with a tiny or worthless transfer. Anyone who later copies the address from there sends to the fraudsters. A two-year measurement found 270 million such attempts, causing at least 83.8 million US dollars in losses. The checker reports two addresses as similar if at least 3 characters at the start and at least 4 at the end are the same but the middle is not.
Is my Ethereum address also valid on Polygon, Arbitrum or Base?
An account with a key has the same address and the same owner on all EVM chains. The address therefore does not say which chain you are sending on; the wallet decides that. Take care with exchanges and contracts: a deposit address often accepts only certain networks, and a contract such as a multisig exists only where it was deployed.
Can I see whether an address belongs to a contract or a wallet?
Not from the address itself; both have the same format. Only a query to the chain (eth_getCode) or a block explorer shows whether code is stored there. Since the Pectra update in May 2025, accounts with a key can also carry code under EIP-7702. This checker deliberately queries nothing and therefore cannot say.
Where does the Ethereum address checker stop?
It checks characters, length and checksum, compares addresses and recognises special cases. Only the recipient can confirm that an address really belongs to them, and the checker does not resolve ENS names. If you want your own application to check addresses like this before sending, with chain, address book and a warning about similar addresses, we will develop it with you.
10 / STUDIES AND SOURCES
What the tool is based on
The guide values and notes above are based on these 14 scientific papers. Each one has been checked via its DOI or the publisher’s page (most recently on 14 November 2026): it exists, it has not been retracted, and its findings still hold for this question today.
Tsuchiya, T.; Dong, J.-D.; Soska, K. et al. (2025): Blockchain Address Poisoning. 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25), pp. 1243–1262
Finding A two-year measurement on Ethereum and BNB Chain: 270 million poisoning attempts against 17 million accounts, at least 83.8 million US dollars in losses. The attackers generate addresses with the same start and end and put them into the history by means of tiny, zero-value or forged transfers, usually shortly after a genuine transfer.
In the tool The rule “at least 3 matching characters at the start and 4 at the end” and the formula for chance matches come from this study’s detection method.
www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/tsuchiya · Conference paper
Guan, S.; Li, K. (2024): Characterizing Ethereum Address Poisoning Attack. Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 986–1000
Finding From November 2022 to February 2024, the authors found millions of forged transfers that exploit the abbreviated address display of wallets and block explorers. Over 1,800 accounts lost money, with around 90 million US dollars in confirmed losses; the targets were mainly holders of USDC and USDT.
In the tool That is why the checker always shows all 40 characters and also compares the middle, which abbreviated displays leave out.
doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3690277 · Conference paper
Chen, Z.; Hu, Y.; He, B. et al. (2025): Dissecting Payload-based Transaction Phishing on Ethereum. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2025
Finding Over 300 days, the authors found 130,637 phishing transactions on Ethereum. For address poisoning alone, the attackers spent around 13.4 ETH a day in fees, by the authors’ account 12.5 per cent of all gas consumption.
In the tool Supports the explanation of why zero and tiny transfers from strangers in your own history are no accident.
doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2025.230311 · Conference paper
Xu, Y.; Guan, M. Y.; Mao, Y. et al. (2026): When and Where You Nudge Matters: Multi-Step Interface Interventions Against Address Poisoning in Crypto Wallets. Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST), pp. 1–21
Finding Online experiment with 351 people and 20 interviews: warnings in the transfer process markedly reduce susceptibility to address poisoning. How much depends on the step at which they appear and in what form.
In the tool The checker puts the warning where the decision is made: directly at the comparison result, not in a general warning text.
doi.org/10.1145/3830398.3830668 · Conference paper
Tan, J.; Bauer, L.; Bonneau, J. et al. (2017): Can Unicorns Help Users Compare Crypto Key Fingerprints?. Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 3787–3798
Finding Experiment with 661 people: a simulated attack with a similar fingerprint succeeded in 6 to 72 per cent of cases, depending on the presentation. Choosing from several similar entries performed poorly.
In the tool The checker does not make anyone choose between similar addresses, but compares by machine and marks every differing position.
doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025733 · Conference paper
Dechand, S.; Schürmann, D.; Busse, K. et al. (2016): An Empirical Study of Textual Key-Fingerprint Representations. 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), pp. 193–208
Finding Study with 1,047 people on six text representations: with hexadecimal strings, a partly matching forged value was overlooked most often.
In the tool Explains why the checker names the differences instead of just displaying both addresses, and why it divides them into groups of four.
www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/dechand · Conference paper
Turner, D.; Shahandashti, S. F.; Petrie, H. (2023): The Effect of Length on Key Fingerprint Verification Security and Usability. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), pp. 1–11
Finding Study with 162 people: the longer the string, the more security-critical errors occur during comparison, especially when the two values are very similar.
In the tool An address has 40 characters; the checker therefore compares all of them by machine instead of relying on the eye.
doi.org/10.1145/3600160.3600187 · Conference paper
Voskobojnikov, A.; Wiese, O.; Mehrabi Koushki, M. et al. (2021): The U in Crypto Stands for Usable: An Empirical Study of User Experience with Mobile Cryptocurrency Wallets. Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 1–14
Finding Analysis of 6,859 app reviews of the five largest mobile wallets: new and experienced users alike stumble over usability problems, sometimes with irreversible losses. Some thought transfers were free, reversible or cancellable at any time.
In the tool That is why the rule of thumb states explicitly that a transfer cannot be reversed.
doi.org/10.1145/3411764.3445407 · Conference paper
Gao, X.; Clark, G. D.; Lindqvist, J. (2016): Of Two Minds, Multiple Addresses, and One Ledger: Characterizing Opinions, Knowledge, and Perceptions of Bitcoin Across Users and Non-Users. Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 1656–1668
Finding Interviews with 20 people: users hardly knew how the protocol works and had wrong ideas, for example about the privacy of their transactions.
In the tool Supports the explanatory sections on what an address is, what it reveals and what it does not.
doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858049 · Conference paper
Mai, A.; Pfeffer, K.; Gusenbauer, M. et al. (2020): User Mental Models of Cryptocurrency Systems – A Grounded Theory Approach. Sixteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2020), pp. 341–358
Finding Qualitative study with 29 people: misconceptions about cryptocurrencies lead to mistakes, and common wallets and exchanges do not catch them.
In the tool That is why the checker explains that an address does not reveal a chain and that the same address is valid on all EVM chains.
www.usenix.org/conference/soups2020/presentation/mai · Conference paper
Krombholz, K.; Judmayer, A.; Gusenbauer, M. et al. (2017): The Other Side of the Coin: User Experiences with Bitcoin Security and Privacy. Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2016), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 555–580
Finding Survey of 990 Bitcoin users: 22 per cent had already lost money, through security incidents or through their own mistakes.
In the tool Shows that your own mistakes are a real risk of loss; the checker targets exactly typing errors.
doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_33 · Conference paper
Fröhlich, M.; Gutjahr, F.; Alt, F. (2020): Don't lose your coin! Investigating Security Practices of Cryptocurrency Users. Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Designing Interactive Systems Conference (DIS), pp. 1751–1763
Finding Interviews with 10 users: the tools they choose depend on three loss risks, and one of them is their own mistake.
In the tool The checker treats typing errors and mix-ups as a topic of their own alongside fraud and names the two separately.
doi.org/10.1145/3357236.3395535 · Conference paper
Muzammil, M.; Wu, Z.; Harisha, L. et al. (2024): Typosquatting 3.0: Characterizing Squatting in Blockchain Naming Systems. 2024 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime), pp. 94–108
Finding A study of 4.9 million names across ENS, Unstoppable Domains and ADAHandles found that similarly spelled names are registered more often every year, thousands of transfers went to them, and wallets do not prevent this.
In the tool That is why the checker does not resolve ENS names, but says that the name and the address behind it must be confirmed with the recipient.
doi.org/10.1109/ecrime66200.2024.00013 · Conference paper
Quinkert, F.; Lauinger, T.; Robertson, W. et al. (2019): It's Not what It Looks Like: Measuring Attacks and Defensive Registrations of Homograph Domains. 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), pp. 259–267
Finding In eight months, the authors found almost 3,000 domains imitating well-known names with look-alike Unicode characters, quite a few of them for phishing and fraud.
In the tool In ENS names, the checker lists every character outside a to z and 0 to 9 with its Unicode number.
doi.org/10.1109/cns.2019.8802671 · Conference paper
Standards, authorities and manufacturer data
- ERC-55: Mixed-case checksum address encoding (Final, with test cases) · Ethereum ERCs
- ERC-1191: Add chain id to mixed-case checksum address encoding (Last Call) · Ethereum ERCs
- ERC-3770: Chain-specific addresses (Draft) · Ethereum ERCs
- ERC-681: URL Format for Transaction Requests (Final) · Ethereum ERCs
- EIP-2537: Precompile for BLS12-381 curve operations (addresses 0x0b to 0x11) · Ethereum EIPs
- EIP-7951: Precompile for secp256r1 Curve Support (address 0x100) · Ethereum EIPs
- EIP-7607: Hardfork Meta Fusaka (mainnet activation 03.12.2025) · Ethereum EIPs
- EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs (Pectra) · Ethereum EIPs
- Chain list with prefixes and chain IDs · ethereum-lists
- Unicode Security Mechanisms: confusables.txt (confusable characters) · Unicode Consortium
11 / MORE TOOLS
Still have a question?
Gas calculator, calldata decoder, Merkle generator and other tools for Ethereum are collected under Web3 tools.
- AT-W32 · Businesses
Blockchain suitability check
Does your project really need a blockchain, or will a database do? - AT-W33 · Businesses
MiCA check
Does your token fall under MiCA, and what obligations follow from that? - AT-W34 · Home & business
Gas calculator
What does a transaction cost on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base or Polygon? - AT-W36 · Businesses
Selector and topic calculator
Which function selector or event topic belongs to this Solidity signature, and the other way round? - AT-W37 · Businesses
Calldata decoder
What does this transaction do? Make calldata readable before you sign. - AT-W38 · Businesses
Merkle allowlist generator
Allowlist for a mint or airdrop: Merkle root and proofs from a list of addresses.
Do you want your users to have addresses checked before they send? We build wallet integrations and interfaces that show the checksum, chain and similar addresses before anyone signs.
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