Tool AT-W39REV. 2026-A
Vesting planner: when are how many tokens unlocked?
A vesting schedule sets out when each group receives its tokens: a part at the start (TGE), then nothing until the cliff, after that continuously or in steps. With the OpenZeppelin VestingWalletCliff, the share built up so far is released at the cliff all at once, so 25.05 % at 12 of 48 months from 01.03.2027. The planner calculates this for several groups, exact to the smallest unit, marks large release dates and supplies a monthly schedule, CSV and contract parameters.
- free
- no sign-up
- runs in your browser
01 / PLANNER
Enter groups, read off releases per month
Planner · Token releases after cliff and vesting
Calculates a release schedule according to the rule of the OpenZeppelin VestingWallet, exact to the smallest token unit. No investment advice and no price forecast: whether a schedule works out economically is not something the tool judges.
Runs in your browser. Nothing is sent or stored.
02 / TERMS
TGE, cliff and vesting: what the contract says
The terms come from employment contracts and initial public offerings, where shares or options only gradually become the employee’s. With tokens the principle is the same, except that a smart contract enforces the deadlines and anyone can check them. Misunderstandings almost always arise at one point: the word “cliff”.
| Term | Meaning | In the contract |
|---|---|---|
| TGE | Token Generation Event: the day on which the token is created or becomes tradable. Reference point for all deadlines. | no value of its own; startTimestamp follows from it |
| TGE share | Part of a group that is unlocked immediately. | does not belong in the wallet, is transferred directly |
| Cliff | Waiting period in which nothing is unlocked. | cliffSeconds (VestingWalletCliff), counted from the start |
| Duration | Time over which the rest is unlocked. | durationSeconds |
| Linear release | An equal part is unlocked every second. | Standard rule of _vestingSchedule |
| Steps | Equal parts per month or quarter. | not in the standard, needs a contract of its own |
| Lockup | Lock-up after which everything is unlocked at once. | VestingWallet with durationSeconds = 0 |
Two readings of “12 months cliff”
If a whitepaper says “12 months cliff, 48 months vesting”, that can mean two things. With OpenZeppelin, the duration counts from the start, the cliff lies within it, and at the cliff the part built up so far is released all at once. From 01.03.2027, that is 25.05 %, not a flat 25 %, because the first year has 366 days and the four years 1,461.
The other reading: first 12 months of lock-up, then vesting begins. If it also ends after 48 months, 33.33 % are unlocked after two years instead of 50.03 %. In the contract this is an ordinary VestingWallet whose start is simply a year later. The planner knows both readings (field “Cliff type”), and which one is meant should be stated explicitly in every contract.
| Month | Cliff with catch-up, 48 months | Lock-up, then 36 months | Cliff with catch-up, monthly steps |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 0 % | 0 % | 0 % |
| 11 | 0 % | 0 % | 0 % |
| 12 | 25,05 % | 0 % | 25 % |
| 13 | 27,17 % | 2,83 % | 27,08 % |
| 24 | 50,03 % | 33,33 % | 50 % |
| 36 | 75,02 % | 66,67 % | 75 % |
| 48 | 100 % | 100 % | 100 % |
Fig. 1 · Position on the monthly date, calculated with the same logic as the planner. The steps lie on the catch-up curve because both count from TGE.
03 / CONTRACT
How the OpenZeppelin VestingWallet calculates
OpenZeppelin Contracts is an open library of contract building blocks for Ethereum and compatible chains; its VestingWallet is the template the planner calculates by. We have read the source code of version 5.7.0 (released on 29 July 2026); the calculation sits in a single function, _vestingSchedule. Before the start it returns 0, from the end the whole amount, and in between menge × (zeitpunkt − start) ÷ dauer, as an integer and therefore rounded down. VestingWalletCliff adds only one condition: before the cliff it is 0. The planner calculates in exactly this way, with BigInt down to the smallest unit, so with 18 decimal places down to one quintillionth of a token.
- Time is Unix time in seconds. The contract compares with
block.timestamp. The planner converts months into seconds as calendar months from TGE; if the day does not exist in the target month (31 January plus one month), the last day of the month applies. - A block is released at the cliff. With a 12-month cliff and a 48-month duration from 01.03.2027, 250,513.34 of 1,000,000 tokens are unlocked at once on 01.03.2028. If the cliff is longer than the duration, the constructor already reverts with
InvalidCliffDuration; the planner reports this beforehand. - Unlocked does not mean paid out. The tokens stay in the contract until someone calls
release(token). Anyone may do that, but the money always goes to the owner of the wallet. - Tokens deposited later catch up. The contract calculates with the balance plus what has already been paid out. Whoever deposits only after the cliff releases the part that has already elapsed immediately.
- Ownership can be transferred. The wallet is
Ownable. That also makes it possible to sell tokens that are not yet unlocked; the source code itself points this out. If that is to be ruled out, a contract of your own is needed. - One wallet per recipient. For a team of five people that means five wallets with the same schedule. For very many recipients, a distribution by Merkle list is more suitable, as the Merkle allowlist generator produces it.
- The standard cannot do steps. Monthly or quarterly releases need an extension that overrides
_vestingSchedule. The planner supplies the step dates and amounts for this.
Deploying VestingWalletCliff
VestingWalletCliff is abstract and cannot be deployed directly as it is. It needs a small contract of your own that calls both constructors. The planner outputs the four values for this per group (button “Copy parameters”):
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {VestingWallet} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/finance/VestingWallet.sol";
import {VestingWalletCliff} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/finance/VestingWalletCliff.sol";
contract VestingMitCliff is VestingWalletCliff {
constructor(address beneficiary, uint64 startTimestamp, uint64 durationSeconds, uint64 cliffSeconds)
VestingWallet(beneficiary, startTimestamp, durationSeconds)
VestingWalletCliff(cliffSeconds)
{}
}Before deployment, every recipient address should be checked, most easily with the Ethereum address checker: a typing error cannot be corrected after deployment. What the setup costs is estimated by the gas calculator. On a testnet it is then worth looking at vestedAmount one second before and exactly at the cliff; that shows whether the contract does what the schedule says.
04 / RELEASE DATES
Large release dates: what is known about the end of lock-ups
The end of lock-up periods after flotations is well researched. After a flotation in the USA, insiders usually may not sell their shares for 180 days. In 1,948 such cases, trading rose permanently by around 40 percent when the period expired, and in the three days around the date the price was on average 1.5 percent below expectation Field and Hanka 2001. For firms with venture capital the effect was clearly larger, and strongest where trading around the date was heaviest Bradley et al. 2001. Managers often sell precisely then and work towards that day Aggarwal et al. 2002.
For tokens there are hardly any such analyses so far: a peer-reviewed study of prices around token releases could not be found as of the checking date. The analogy is still compelling, because the pattern is the same: on the release date many people who could not sell before are allowed to sell at once. Whether they do so and what the market makes of it, the planner does not predict. It only shows when such dates fall and how large they are.
| Rule | Threshold | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Share of the total amount | from 5 % in one month | The amount that may be sold at once. |
| Growth in the unlocked amount | from 25 % in one month | Early in the schedule little is unlocked; then even a small release carries weight Bradley et al. 2001. |
| Several cliffs at once | named as a reason | If the waiting periods of several groups end in the same month, the blocks add up. |
The thresholds are rules of thumb from our own experience. The studies show that large release dates have an effect, not from what size. TGE itself does not count; it appears as “Unlocked at TGE” in the summary.
The example plan in the planner
A plan with 6 groups and 1,000,000,000 tokens, TGE on 01.03.2027, is preset. It is meant for trying things out, not as a recommendation. At TGE 13 % are unlocked, after 12 months 39.5 %, fully on 01.03.2031. There is one large release date, in month 12 (01.03.2028): 7.1 % of the total amount, mainly because of the team’s cliff, at which 25.1 % of the team tokens are unlocked at once.
| Group | Share | at TGE | Cliff | Duration | Type | Contract | average lock-up time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Team · Team and founders | 20 % | 0 % | 12 mo. | 48 mo. | Cliff with catch-up, continuous (like VestingWallet) | VestingWalletCliff | 25.8 mo. |
| Investors · Investors | 15 % | 10 % | 6 mo. | 18 mo. | Lock-up, then vesting, in monthly steps | own contract | 13.9 mo. |
| Advisers · Advisers | 5 % | 0 % | 6 mo. | 24 mo. | Cliff with catch-up, continuous (like VestingWallet) | VestingWalletCliff | 13 mo. |
| Community · Community and airdrop | 30 % | 5 % | 0 mo. | 36 mo. | Cliff with catch-up, in monthly steps | own contract | 17.5 mo. |
| Reserve · Reserve (treasury) | 20 % | 0 % | 0 mo. | 48 mo. | Cliff with catch-up, continuous (like VestingWallet) | VestingWallet | 24.4 mo. |
| Liquidity · Liquidity and exchanges | 10 % | 100 % | 0 mo. | 0 mo. | everything at TGE | none needed | 0 mo. |
05 / SIGNAL
Vesting as a signal: those who are locked in for long show confidence
Why do lock-ups exist at all? For flotations the data speak mainly for self-commitment: where insiders would have more room for self-interest, they lock up their shares for longer Brav and Gompers 2003. A counter-calculation shows that the lock-up is at the same time a signal and is shorter when a firm is more transparent Brau et al. 2005. Both fit together: anyone locked in for a long time has less to explain.
With token sales the picture is similar. Issuers who keep more of their tokens raise more money and more often bring out a working product Davydiuk et al. 2023. Ten percent fewer tokens sold brought 3.2 percent more money; lock-ups for the buyers, on the other hand, went with a poorer return Fuchs and Momtaz 2025. So commitment works for the team, not as a shackle for the buyers. Whether the venture grows later was linked to disclosure and credible commitment Howell et al. 2020, and a lock-up enforced in the contract works differently from an announcement: in the experiment, advertising signals lost their effect as soon as a technical lock-up was in play Bruckner et al. 2023.
That is why the planner gives two notes. If the team receives tokens at TGE without a waiting period, this sign is missing. And if the team is locked in for a shorter time on average than the investors, the order is wrong. In the example plan the team is locked in for 25.8 months, the investors for 13.9.
Average lock-up time and key dates
The average lock-up time is the month in which the tokens are unlocked, weighted by amount. The idea comes from research on executive pay, which uses it to make the duration of share packages comparable Gopalan et al. 2014. The planner calculates it on a monthly grid; with continuous release it is therefore up to one month too high, which does not matter for comparing the groups.
A second finding speaks for continuous release rather than a few large steps. In quarters in which many of a director’s shares were unlocked, investment grew more slowly and more positive forecasts appeared Edmans et al. 2017. In such months directors published around 20 percent more voluntary disclosures and sold soon afterwards Edmans et al. 2018. Every key date is an incentive to work towards it. The more evenly a schedule releases, the smaller that incentive.
And one more thing: information about token schedules on aggregator sites often differs; an analysis of 19 data sources first had to clean the data at great effort Lyandres et al. 2022. So calculate with the values that are in the contract, and publish the schedule yourself, for example as a CSV from the planner.
06 / METHOD
From schedule to contract
- Define groups and shares. Who gets how much, and who receives something at TGE? Whether the token needs a whitepaper under MiCA is clarified beforehand by the MiCA check.
- Write down the reading of the cliff. Cliff with catch-up or lock-up followed by vesting. One sentence in the contract spares any dispute later.
- Spread out large dates. If the cliffs of team and investors fall in the same month, move one or choose continuous release instead of large steps.
- Check addresses. One wallet per recipient, every address checked against its checksum.
- Recalculate on a testnet. Query
vestedAmountone second before the cliff, at the cliff and at the end, and compare with the planner’s table. - Deposit and publish. Transfer TGE shares directly, deposit the rest into the wallets, publish the schedule with the contract addresses. If the contract departs from the standard, an independent audit should come first.
Where the planner stops
- No investment advice, no price forecast. The planner says when a contract releases tokens. What buyers or the market make of it, it does not say.
- One calculation rule. Calculations follow OpenZeppelin 5.7.0. Other contracts, for example with revocation by the issuer or with release by blocks instead of seconds, may calculate differently.
- Unlocked is not in circulation. Unlocked tokens stay in the contract until someone calls
release, and not everyone sells them. Tokens that are not allocated are not counted by the planner at all. - Monthly grid. The table and chart show the position on the monthly date. With continuous release, more is already unlocked between two monthly dates.
We implement the vesting contract for you on request, also with steps or other special cases, and build a display in which team and investors can see their own position. What else we develop for Web3 projects is described under Web3 development; more tools for tokens and smart contracts are collected in the overview of the Web3 tools.
07 / FOR AI ASSISTANTS
Using this tool from an AI assistant
Assistants such as Claude or ChatGPT that speak the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can call this page’s calculation directly instead of rebuilding it. The server is public, needs no sign-in and stores nothing. The answer always includes the link to this page, the date of the data and the limits of the result.
- Endpoint
https://aureum-tech.com/mcp- Tool
werkzeug_vesting_planer- Transport
- Streamable HTTP, read-only
| Name | Required | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
gesamtmenge | yes | Total amount in whole tokens as text, e.g. "1000000000"; decimal places with a full stop. |
dezimalstellen | no | Decimal places of the token (ERC-20 decimals). 18 if not specified. |
tge | yes | Time of the TGE in UTC, ISO 8601 such as "2027-03-01T12:00", or Unix seconds as text. |
symbol | no | Token symbol for the output, e.g. "TOK". |
gruppen | yes | Groups in the schedule, at most 12. |
monatsplan | no | true (default): include the position on every monthly date. false: summary, parameters and dates only. |
Questions where an assistant should call it
- “How many tokens are unlocked after one year with a 12-month cliff and 48 months of vesting, if I use OpenZeppelin VestingWalletCliff?”
- “Which parameters with Unix time do I need for a VestingWallet that releases over 36 months from 1 March 2027?”
- “Our plan: team 20 % with a 12-month cliff, investors 15 % with 10 % at TGE, community 30 % over 36 months. When are there large release dates?”
- “What percentage of the total amount is unlocked at TGE and after 24 months?”
How the connection works and what MCP can do in your own business is explained on the page about MCP integrations.
08 / COMMON QUESTIONS
Common questions about vesting, cliff and TGE
What happens at the cliff in the OpenZeppelin VestingWallet?
Until the cliff, VestingWalletCliff releases nothing. At the cliff itself, the share that would have built up linearly since the start is released, all at once. With a 12-month cliff and a 48-month duration from 01.03.2027, that is 25.05 %, and after that it continues second by second. The reason is the rule in the contract: before the cliff _vestingSchedule returns 0; from the cliff onward, it returns the normal linear calculation.
Cliff with catch-up or lock-up followed by vesting: what is the difference?
With a cliff with catch-up, the duration counts from TGE, and a whole block is released at the cliff (25.05 % at 12 of 48 months). With a lock-up followed by vesting, the duration only begins after the cliff; after 24 months, 33.33 % are then unlocked instead of 50.03 %. In the contract, the second is simply a VestingWallet with a later start. Which reading is meant should be stated explicitly in every contract and every whitepaper.
How do I convert months into seconds for the VestingWallet?
The contract only knows seconds. Calendar months differ in length, so the planner counts from TGE to the same day of the target month and takes the difference in seconds. 12 months from 01.03.2027 are 366 days (31,622,400 seconds), because 29 February 2028 falls in between; 48 months are 1,461 days. If you simply use 30 days per month, you end up five to six days too early after one year.
Can the VestingWallet release in monthly steps?
No. The standard contract releases linearly, that is, a little every second. Monthly or quarterly steps need a contract of their own or an extension that overrides _vestingSchedule. For this the planner supplies the step dates as Unix times and the cumulative amounts in the smallest unit.
What does the TGE share mean, and does it belong in the contract?
The TGE share is the part of a group that is already unlocked at the start, for example 10 percent for investors. It does not belong in a VestingWallet: whatever is held there follows the schedule. The TGE share is transferred directly at the start, and only the rest goes into the contract. The planner shows both amounts separately.
Why does the planner mark large release dates?
Because the end of a lock-up has a measurable effect on shares: trading rose permanently by an average of 40 percent, and in the three days around the date the price was 1.5 percent below expectation. The planner marks months with 5 percent of the total amount or more, or a 25 percent increase in the unlocked amount. This is not a price forecast, and for tokens there is hardly any peer-reviewed research on the subject yet.
Do I need a separate VestingWallet for each person?
Yes, if the tokens go directly to individuals: the wallet always pays out to its owner, and that is exactly one address. For a team of five people that means five wallets with the same schedule and different amounts. For many recipients, for example in an airdrop, a separate distribution contract or a Merkle list is usually the better solution.
Where does the vesting planner stop?
It calculates when a contract releases tokens under the OpenZeppelin rule, accurately to the smallest unit. It does not judge whether the schedule works out economically, how the price will develop, or whether the token needs a whitepaper under MiCA. We implement the contract itself, test every release date on a testnet and, if you wish, build a display in which all parties can see their position.
09 / STUDIES AND SOURCES
What the tool is based on
The guideline values and notes above rest on these 13 scientific papers. Each was checked via its DOI or the publisher’s page (most recently on 14 November 2026): it exists, it has not been retracted, and its finding still holds for the question today.
Field, L. C.; Hanka, G. (2001): The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups. The Journal of Finance 56 (2), 471–500
Finding 1,948 lock-ups after flotations, mostly 180 days: while they apply, insiders hardly sell. When they expire, trading rises permanently by around 40 percent, and the price is on average 1.5 percent below expectation over three days; clearly more so when venture capital investors are involved.
In the tool Reason why the planner specifically reports months with large releases and names investor groups in them.
doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00334 · Journal article
Bradley, D. J.; Jordan, B. D.; Yi, H.-C.; Roten, I. C. (2001): Venture Capital and IPO Lockup Expiration: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Research 24 (4), 465–493
Finding 2,529 flotations from 1988 to 1997: lock-up expiries go on average with negative abnormal returns, concentrated in firms with venture capital, and strongest where the price had risen most beforehand and where trading around the date is heaviest.
In the tool Explains the second threshold: the planner also measures a release against the amount unlocked so far, not only against the total amount.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00826.x · Journal article
Aggarwal, R. K.; Krigman, L.; Womack, K. L. (2002): Strategic IPO underpricing, information momentum, and lockup expiration selling. Journal of Financial Economics 66 (1), 105–137
Finding Managers rarely sell themselves at the flotation, but often at the end of the lock-up. Data from the 1990s fit a model in which they deliberately raise attention until that date in order to sell at a higher price.
In the tool Explains why the expiry of a lock-up is a date that those involved work towards, and why the planner makes these dates visible.
doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00152-6 · Journal article
Brav, A.; Gompers, P. A. (2003): The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings. The Review of Financial Studies 16 (1), 1–29
Finding 2,794 flotations: lock-ups work mainly as self-commitment against misaligned incentives. Where this room for manoeuvre is larger, insiders lock up their shares for longer.
In the tool Reason for the note when the team receives tokens without a waiting period or is locked in for a shorter time on average than the investors.
doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0001 · Journal article
Brau, J. C.; Lambson, V. E.; McQueen, G. (2005): Lockups Revisited. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (3), 519–530
Finding Counter-model to Brav and Gompers: lock-ups are also a signal of good firms. They are shorter when a firm is more transparent or riskier; confirmed on 4,013 flotations and 3,279 follow-on offerings.
In the tool Supports the advice to disclose the schedule: whoever makes their releases verifiable does not need the length of the lock-up as the only signal.
doi.org/10.1017/S002210900000185X · Journal article
Howell, S. T.; Niessner, M.; Yermack, D. (2020): Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales. The Review of Financial Studies 33 (9), 3925–3974
Finding Over 1,500 token sales totalling 12.9 billion dollars: whether the venture later grows and survives is linked to disclosure, credible commitment to the project and quality signals.
In the tool That is why the planner supplies the schedule as a table, CSV and contract parameters: disclosure and a commitment that the contract enforces.
doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz131 · Journal article
Davydiuk, T.; Gupta, D.; Rosen, S. (2023): De-Crypto-ing Signals in Initial Coin Offerings: Evidence of Rational Token Retention. Management Science 69 (11), 6584–6624
Finding Issuers who keep a larger part of their tokens raise more money and more often bring out a working product. The signal weighs more when many sales run at the same time and investors have little time to check.
In the tool Underpins the section “Vesting as a signal” and the figure for how long each group is locked in on average.
doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4631 · Journal article
Fuchs, J.; Momtaz, P. P. (2025): Token governance in initial coin offerings: Implications of token retention and resale restrictions for ICO success. Small Business Economics 64 (3), 1321–1359
Finding Ten percent fewer tokens sold raise the amount collected by 3.2 percent. Lock-ups that forbid buyers to resell, on the other hand, go with a poorer return over twelve months.
In the tool Reason for the distinction in the text: commitment by the team works as a signal, a long lock-up for buyers is not a seal of quality.
doi.org/10.1007/s11187-024-00945-9 · Journal article
Bruckner, M. T.; Steininger, D. M.; Thatcher, J. B.; Veit, D. J. (2023): The effect of lockup and persuasion on online investment decisions: An experimental study in ICOs. Electronic Markets 33, Art. 31
Finding Experiment with 473 people: without a technically enforced lock-up, investors are moved to buy by advertising signals from social media; with a lock-up, they no longer are. Lock-up and advertising together even made the offer less credible.
In the tool Supports the note that a lock-up enforced in the contract works differently from a mere announcement in the whitepaper.
doi.org/10.1007/s12525-023-00648-1 · Journal article
Edmans, A.; Fang, V. W.; Lewellen, K. A. (2017): Equity Vesting and Investment. The Review of Financial Studies 30 (7), 2229–2271
Finding In quarters in which many of a director’s shares and options are unlocked, research spending and investment grow more slowly, and more positive forecasts appear. The release date therefore changes decisions.
In the tool Explains why the planner offers continuous release alongside steps: the fewer key dates, the less incentive to work towards one date.
doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx018 · Journal article
Edmans, A.; Goncalves-Pinto, L.; Groen-Xu, M.; Wang, Y. (2018): Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months. The Review of Financial Studies 31 (11), 4099–4141
Finding In months in which shares are unlocked, directors publish around 20 percent more voluntary disclosures, all of them good news. Price and trading rise briefly, and the directors sell soon afterwards.
In the tool Second evidence for marking months with large releases: with these dates it is worth looking at your own communication.
doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy070 · Journal article
Gopalan, R.; Milbourn, T.; Song, F.; Thakor, A. V. (2014): Duration of Executive Compensation. The Journal of Finance 69 (6), 2777–2817
Finding Introduces a duration measure for pay, weighted by the vesting periods of its parts. Longer duration is found in firms with more growth opportunities and long-term assets, and goes with fewer embellished earnings.
In the tool Model for the “average lock-up time” per group: the mean of the release months, weighted by amount.
doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12085 · Journal article
Lyandres, E.; Palazzo, B.; Rabetti, D. (2022): Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Success and Post-ICO Performance. Management Science 68 (12), 8658–8679
Finding Data from 19 sources, including 11 aggregator sites for token sales: the publicly available information has considerable quality defects, which the study first cleans up systematically.
In the tool Reason why the planner calculates from your own contract parameters and not from information on aggregator sites.
doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4312 · Journal article
Standards, authorities and manufacturer data
- VestingWallet.sol, OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.7.0 (source code) · OpenZeppelin, released 29.07.2026
- VestingWalletCliff.sol, OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.7.0 (source code) · OpenZeppelin
- API reference Finance (VestingWallet, VestingWalletCliff) · OpenZeppelin Docs 5.x
- Units and Globally Available Variables: block.timestamp · Solidity documentation
- ERC-20 Token Standard: decimals · Ethereum Improvement Proposals
10 / MORE TOOLS
Still have a question?
- AT-W32 · Businesses
Blockchain suitability check
Does your project really need a blockchain, or will a database do? - AT-W33 · Businesses
MiCA check
Does your token fall under MiCA, and what obligations follow from that? - AT-W34 · Home & business
Gas calculator
What does a transaction cost on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base or Polygon? - AT-W35 · Home & business
Ethereum address checker
Is this Ethereum address valid and correctly written? EIP-55 checksum and comparison of two addresses. - AT-W36 · Businesses
Selector and topic calculator
Which function selector or event topic belongs to this Solidity signature, and the other way round? - AT-W37 · Businesses
Calldata decoder
What does this transaction do? Make calldata readable before you sign.
Do you have your schedule? Send us the CSV or the parameters. We implement the vesting contract, check every release date in advance on a testnet and, if you wish, build a display in which all parties can see their position.
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